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ABSTRACT

Federal judges have too many options for deferring to foreign courts, none of them particularly good. Not only have
judges developed at least five different bases for declining to hear transnational cases, but the use of these bases also
varies significantly from circuit to circuit. The courts of appeals have split over whether to recognize foreign relations
abstention or prudential exhaustion, and they have developed different tests for assessing foreign parallel
proceedings. Even with forum non conveniens, where the Supreme Court has provided clearer guidance, circuit
practice has diverged. Thus in two recent transnational tort cases stemming from the Fukushima nuclear disaster
in Japan, a district court in the First Circuit dismissed on a discretionary basis that a district court in the Ninth
Circuit had rejected, while the district court in the Ninth Circuit dismissed on a discretionary basis not yet
recognized by the First Circuit.
This Article uses the Fukushima cases as an opportunity to step back and assess the full range of federal judge-made
doctrines for deferring to foreign courts. Its primary aim is to provide a practical roadmap for judges and litigants,
one that surveys inter-circuit variation, identifies best practices, and suggests doctrinal refinements. It proposes an
updated and simplified rubric for forum non conveniens, a consolidated approach to foreign parallel proceedings, and
a distinct doctrine for deference to foreign bankruptcies. It also argues for rejecting prudential exhaustion and
abstention based on foreign relations concerns, and it encourages judges to analyze questions of judgment recognition
and the extraterritorial application of federal statutes without resorting to loose invocations of “abstention” or
“international comity.” Judicial deference to foreign courts is sometimes necessary, but it need not be muddled or
haphazard.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2020, both the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit affirmed
dismissals of tort cases arising out of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant disaster in Japan. Though the outcome was the same, the courts
got there by invoking different, highly discretionary doctrines. In the First
Circuit case, Imamura v. General Electric Co., Japanese plaintiffs who lived near
the Fukushima power plant sued General Electric, which had designed,
constructed, and helped maintain the plant’s boiling water reactors, in
General Electric’s home state of Massachusetts.1 That case was dismissed for
forum non conveniens, a doctrine focused on “considerations of [party]
convenience and judicial efficiency.”2 In the Ninth Circuit case, Cooper v.
Tokyo Electric Power Co. Holdings, U.S. servicemembers who were serving in a
humanitarian mission at the time of the meltdown sued Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO), the operator of the plant.3 That case, brought in
California where many of the plaintiffs were stationed, was dismissed for
“[i]nternational comity . . . abstention,” a new Ninth Circuit doctrine that

1
2
3

Imamura v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Imamura II), 957 F.3d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 2020).
Imamura v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Imamura I), 371 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D. Mass. 2019) (quoting Iragorri v.
Int’l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000)).
Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co. (Cooper V), 960 F.3d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 2020).
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permits abstention “where the issues to be resolved are ‘entangled in
international relations.’”4
But these dismissals were not really about defendant inconvenience or
international relations: General Electric was sued in its home forum in
Imamura,5 while Cooper was dismissed despite the Executive Branch’s
preference for retaining jurisdiction.6 Rather, what appeared to motivate the
judges in both cases was Japan’s decision to channel all liability to a single
defendant (TEPCO), which it had made strictly liable for the disaster and for
which it was largely footing the bill.7 In other words, Japan had particularly
strong interests in adjudicating these cases: not only was the disaster a matter
of major national importance, implicating government decisionmakers and
primarily impacting Japanese citizens, and not only would Japanese law
apply even if the cases were heard in California or Massachusetts,8 but Japan
was also bankrolling an effort to resolve millions of claims as part of a tradeoff it had made decades earlier to further a particular governmental policy
(that of promoting nuclear power).9 The framing of both forum non
conveniens and international comity abstention forced the U.S. judges to
address these valid adjudicatory interests indirectly, channeled through
factors that shifted emphasis to convenience or politics and required some
creative justifications.
This Article uses the Fukushima cases as an opportunity to step back and
take stock of the grounds on which federal courts may decline their
jurisdiction in transnational cases.10 For simplicity, I refer to these doctrines
4
5
6
7

8
9

10

Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co. (Cooper IV), No. 12cv3032, 2019 WL 1017266, at *13 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2019) (quoting Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)).
See Imamura II, 957 F.3d at 104 (“GE maintains its corporate headquarters and principal place of
business in Boston, Massachusetts.”).
See Cooper IV, 2019 WL 1017266, at *14 (noting the U.S. State Department submitted an amicus
brief supporting the U.S. court retaining jurisdiction).
See, e.g., Imamura II, 957 F.3d at 102–03 (explaining Japan’s Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage and the channels of relief for victims of the Fukushima disaster). As of early 2019,
TEPCO—with the significant assistance of the Japanese Government—had already paid more
than $75 billion to resolve claims through mediation, settlement, and litigation. See id. at 103 (noting
TEPCO paid out ¥8.721 trillion to victims).
Cooper IV, 2019 WL 1017266, at *12; Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 14; see also infra note 103
(discussing Massachusetts choice of law).
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14 (D. Mass. 2019) (noting this plan was “key for ensuring that
companies are willing to enter the nuclear power business in Japan and citizens are adequately
compensated when something goes wrong”).
My focus is entirely on the federal courts. My arguments draw on the limited scope of the Article
III judicial power, as well as federal interests in providing forums for foreign parties and promoting
international cooperation. State courts have developed their own doctrines regarding the
management of transnational cases. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Presumptions Against Extraterritoriality
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of negative adjudicative comity as forms of transnational abstention given
that they are all “judicially created doctrines under which federal courts may
choose to decline to exercise their jurisdiction over cases otherwise
appropriately before them.”11 This category includes the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, the various tests employed by the federal circuits to defer to
foreign parallel proceedings,12 deference to foreign bankruptcy proceedings,
prudential exhaustion requirements, and foreign relations abstention. The
use of these abstention doctrines varies significantly across the federal
circuits, which have developed different tests for forum non conveniens and
foreign parallel proceedings, as well as different understandings of what
exactly “international comity abstention” means.13 The version of
international comity abstention applied in Cooper, for example, has only been
recognized by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, while the Third Circuit has
rejected it;14 the Supreme Court seemed poised to resolve that circuit split
last Term, but then managed to avoid the question (again).15

11
12

13

14

15

in State Law, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1389, 1401–13 (2020) (charting differences in how states
address extraterritorial application of state law).
William P. Marshall, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and Recasting the Meaning of Judicial Restraint, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 881, 883 (2013).
The Supreme Court has at times suggested that the label of “abstention” is limited to just a handful
of domestic doctrines (which does not include Colorado River). See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 722–23 (1996) (distinguishing forum non conveniens from the formal abstention
doctrines even though they share the “similar premise” of federal courts “relinquish[ing] their
jurisdiction in favor of another forum”). I am purposefully invoking “abstention” to refer more
broadly to a type of procedural move—the “relinquish[ing]” of the federal courts’ otherwise valid
jurisdiction “in favor of another forum”—that is common across the formal abstention doctrines,
Colorado River deference, and the transnational doctrines gathered here. I do so because the
separation of powers concern that underlays Quackenbush and motivates this Article’s reform
proposals applies whenever federal courts voluntarily abdicate their jurisdiction, regardless of the
lines of precedent on which they rely.
See Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 312
(2002) (noting variation across federal courts in their treatment of forum non conveniens); Maggie
Gardner, Abstention at the Border, 105 VA. L. REV. 63, 96–108 (2019) (discussing variation in how the
federal circuits define international comity abstention and address foreign parallel proceedings); see
also infra Part II (discussing intercircuit variation).
Compare Mujica v. Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 615 (9th Cir. 2014) (abstaining in a suit brought
against two U.S. corporations over civilian bombings in Columbia), and Ungaro-Benages v.
Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (abstaining in a Holocaust restitution
case), with Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 394 (3d Cir. 2006) (declining
to follow Ungardo-Benages in another Holocaust restitution case).
See Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, No. 19-351, slip op. at 15–16 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“We do
not address Germany’s argument that the District Court was obligated to abstain from deciding the
case on international comity grounds.”). This was not the first time the Court has avoided
addressing the existence (much less the contours) of international comity abstention. See Gardner,
supra note 13, at 65 & n.2 (discussing Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138
S. Ct. 1865 (2018), and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993)).

December 2021]

DEFERRING TO FOREIGN COURTS

2231

In short, federal doctrines of transnational abstention remain uncertain
and undertheorized twenty years after Professor Stephen Burbank published
the article on which this festschrift contribution builds. In Jurisdictional
Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in International Law,
Professor Burbank used the ill-fated negotiations over a judgments-andjurisdiction treaty to propose domestic reforms for forum non conveniens, lis
alibi pendens, and antisuit injunctions.16 Particularly given the context of treaty
negotiations, his focus was on legislative reform. But Congress continues to
show little interest in legislating transnational procedure, perhaps dissuaded
by cries of state prerogatives or distracted by the more exciting business of
unilaterally undermining sovereign immunity for a select set of transnational
cases.17 And while a judgments convention has now been achieved, paving
the way for renewed negotiations regarding a jurisdictional addendum,18 it is
hard to imagine Congress turning to such relatively low-profile issues in the
near term. For now, any salvation (to borrow Professor Kevin Clermont’s
contemporaneous turn of phrase) will have to come from the courts
themselves, working through the fragmented, gradual and imperfect process
of common law decisionmaking.19 In updating Professor Burbank’s
prescriptions for doctrines of jurisdictional equilibration, then, this Article
focuses on what the lower federal courts can and are doing on their own. It
treats the federal circuits as true laboratories of innovation, with some
experiments that have failed, but also some that have worked. Its practical

16

17

18

19

Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National
Law, 49 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 203 (2001) [hereinafter Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration]. This Article
also draws on Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via
Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Paths to a Via Media], and owes a
significant debt to Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 89 (1999) (arguing that negotiations over the original judgments convention could inspire
much-needed reform within domestic U.S. procedure).
On Congress’s support of terrorism-related transnational litigation, see Aaron D. Simowitz, Defining
Daimler’s Domain: Consent, Jurisdiction, and the Regulation of Terrorism, 55 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 576,
586–88 (2020). On misdirected invocations of federalism as blocking national legislation, see
Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at The Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 629, 642–43 (2012) and Stephen
B. Burbank, Federalism and Private International Law: Implementing the Hague Choice of Court Convention in
the United States, 2 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 287, 287 (2006) (discussing possible implementation of the Hague
Choice of Courts Convention).
A judgments treaty was achieved in part by setting aside the jurisdictional questions, which would
include Professor Burbank’s doctrines of jurisdictional equilibration. Those questions are now the
subject of renewed negotiations. See generally Eva Jueptner, The Hague Jurisdiction Project—What Options
for The Hague Conference?, 16 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 247 (2020).
Indeed, the one piece of jurisdictional salvation to emerge from the last round of negotiations in the
Hague was arguably Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137–38
(2014), in which the Court laid to rest the U.S. practice of “doing business” jurisdiction.
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goal is to help identify the successful experiments and to defend the wider
adoption of those experiments in lieu of more problematic ones.
In building that roadmap, I start from the understanding that abstention
is generally disfavored because it impinges on Congress’s authority to define
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.20 That initial presumption is critical
because the judicial power to decline jurisdiction, if widely invoked or loosely
applied, can impede Congress’s efforts to provide forums for certain litigants
or to provide relief for particular wrongs. In an era of judge-led procedural
retrenchment,21 federal judges should be wary of further restricting
Congress’s powers via discretionary judge-made doctrines. Yet instead of
narrowing those safety valves, the lower federal courts have been creating
new bases for abstention in transnational cases. From the perspective of
Congress and state legislators, this expanding discretion in the lower courts
further displaces their ability to decide what rights can be vindicated and by
whom.22
To the extent that forum non conveniens reflects abstention from
personal jurisdiction rather than (or in addition to) subject matter
jurisdiction,23 the need for such equilibration has decreased significantly
since Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert.24 Since it first recognized the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court has curtailed the use of
attachment jurisdiction25 and “doing business” jurisdiction.26 It has also
added reasonableness factors to the personal jurisdiction analysis27 and

20

21

22

23
24
25
26
27

See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (noting the federal courts’ “strict
duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress”); New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“Our cases have long
supported the proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of
jurisdiction that has been conferred.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given.”).
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 1543, 1580 (2014) (observing the Supreme Court has had “greater success in the enterprise
of litigation reform” than Congress).
Congress has shown recent interest, for example, in encouraging transnational litigation. See, e.g.,
Aaron D. Simowitz, The Private Law of Terror, 125 PENN ST. L. REV. 159, 194–96 (2021) (describing
several congressional statutes adopted over the last five years aimed at enabling terrorism-related
lawsuits brought by private parties).
Professor William Dodge has brought this possible distinction to my attention.
330 U.S. 501 (1947).
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014) (limiting general, or all-purpose, jurisdiction
to the forum in which the defendant is “at home”).
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985).
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signaled in recent years an interest in cabining specific jurisdiction.28 As the
Court narrows the constitutionally permissible scope of personal jurisdiction
(for better or for worse), there should be less need for jurisdictional safety
valves like forum non conveniens that enable case-by-case correction for
exorbitant jurisdictional claims.29
In gathering best practices and potential reforms, I also favor simpler tests
for two reasons. First, in practical terms, unnecessarily complex tests can
make the work of judging harder as judges strain to interpret and apply
unhelpful or repetitive factors. Second, that practical difficulty in applying
needlessly complex or outdated tests can encourage heuristics to accumulate
within a doctrine, leading to distortions in the doctrine and thus in case
outcomes over time.30 Favoring simpler tests means excising redundant
factors, updating anachronistic factors, specifying vague factors, and
clarifying (or dropping) ill-fitting factors.
Tests are also easier to apply when they address directly the questions
that judges are struggling to answer. The Fukushima cases illustrate that
current doctrines of transnational abstention inadequately address the
problem of competing adjudicatory interests.31 I purposefully use the term
“adjudicatory interests” in contrast to the more familiar term of “regulatory
interests.” Regulatory (or prescriptive) interests relate to a sovereign’s interest
in having its law applied to the parties’ conduct. Regulatory interests are
already addressed through choice of law and various related doctrines
(including the presumption against extraterritoriality,32 the admittedly vague

28
29

30
31

32

See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (rejecting a
sliding scale approach to determining minimum contacts).
See, e.g., Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 431 (2017)
(“Eliminate exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, and the need for forum non conveniens . . . is largely
eliminated as well.”); see also Clermont, supra note 16, at 120 (“The main function of forum non
conveniens is to mitigate the abuses of exorbitant jurisdiction . . . .”). For a fuller discussion of
exorbitant jurisdiction, see generally Kevin M. Clermont & John R. B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction,
58 ME. L. REV. 474, 474–82 (2006).
Cf. Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941, 958–67 (2017) (describing process
by which heuristics can develop in and distort procedural doctrines).
Cf. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LIS PENDENS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 89 (2009) (arguing
for greater attention to “conflict of litigation” as distinct from “conflict of laws”); Elizabeth T. Lear,
National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559, 569
(2007) (arguing that forum non conveniens should “focus on adjudicatory rather than regulatory
interests”).
See generally William S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1582 (2020)
(describing recent developments in the Supreme Court’s treatment of the presumption).
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concept of “unreasonable interference,”33 and the now-outdated Section 403
factors,34 which were based on the Timberlane factors35). But just because a
sovereign has a greater interest in regulating conduct or having its law
applied to a dispute does not always mean it has a greater interest in itself
doing the applying.36 Because federal courts are able and willing to apply
foreign law when appropriate, they should abstain in favor of foreign courts
primarily when the foreign sovereign has a greater interest in itself adjudicating
the dispute. Thus this Article’s roadmap to transnational abstention highlights
potential reforms that would help shift the focus of these doctrines away from
party or judicial convenience and towards the evaluation of specific
adjudicatory interests.
What, then, are specific adjudicatory interests? All else being equal,
sovereigns have adjudicatory interests in resolving disputes involving their
citizens or residents and in applying their own laws. If those connections are
entirely absent in the United States but exist for another sovereign, that
sovereign most likely has a greater interest in adjudicating the dispute.
Sovereigns also have an adjudicatory interest in protecting the exercise of
jurisdiction by their courts. This protective interest might arise in a range of
circumstances: in maintaining exclusive jurisdiction over a particular res, for
example, or in avoiding duplicative litigation in other forums, or in
consolidating interrelated claims (like in bankruptcy) before one
decisionmaker. This protective interest might also arise when a sovereign is
attempting to resolve many similar claims consistently if that effort would be

33

34

35

36

See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (“[T]his Court
ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations.”).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(AM. L. INST. 1987) (listing eight factors to consider when determining whether a state’s exercise of
jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable). The new Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States has retired § 403. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 405 rep. n.6 (AM. L. INST. 2018) (noting that § 403 has
been replaced with the concept of “unreasonable inference” as a tool of statutory interpretation).
See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614–15 (9th Cir. 1976)
(identifying seven factors for evaluating when “the contacts and interests of the United States are
sufficient to support” the extraterritorial application of U.S. law).
Nevertheless, courts and commentators have at times elided the difference between the two ideas.
See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2016) (invoking “abstention”
to consider whether Chinese and U.S. law conflict), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Animal Sci.
Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018); Donald Earl Childress III,
Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 16 &
n.18 (2010) (arguing for resituating abstention in transnational cases around conflicts of law
principles). But Professor Childress agrees that adjudicative comity analysis should focus on governmental
interests and should start with a strong presumption in favor of U.S. adjudication. Id. at 66.
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undermined by piecemeal litigation in other forums. This was the animating
concern in the Fukushima cases, and perhaps also in other transnational
cases in which federal courts have struggled to explain their abstention
decisions under current doctrine.37
Part I uses the dismissals in Imamura and Cooper to illustrate how two
doctrines of transnational abstention—forum non conveniens and
international comity abstention—are not asking the right questions. As a
result, judges are tempted to expand the scope of these doctrines to
accommodate the cases they are confronting, an expansion that is in tension
with the courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise their
jurisdiction. Turning from critique to prescription, Part II provides a
practical roadmap to transnational abstention for judges and litigants. It
draws on the work of the lower federal courts to highlight best practices while
also proposing some additional reforms. In particular, it maps an updated
and refined doctrine of forum non conveniens38 and articulates a uniform
doctrine for deferring to foreign parallel proceedings. It also recommends
rejecting abstention based on foreign relations concerns or prudential
exhaustion, and it warns against invoking “abstention” to address issues of
preclusion or statutory interpretation. The roadmap also describes the use of
abstention to defer to foreign insolvency proceedings but notes that such use
has been largely displaced by Congress’s adoption of a multilateral model
law.
Such multilateral coordination, implemented through national
legislation, should continue to be the end goal for other doctrines of
transnational abstention. In the meantime, the federal courts can lay the
groundwork for future treaties and legislative compromises by working to
rationalize and simplify the many judge-made doctrines of transnational
abstention. In doing so, they will also demonstrate greater fealty to the
choices Congress makes regarding the work assigned to the federal courts.
37

38

See infra subsection II.A.3 (discussing cases). Note there is some overlap between these protective
factors and the factors federal judges consider when weighing antisuit injunctions. See GARY B.
BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
561–71 (6th ed. 2018) (summarizing federal caselaw on antisuit injunctions). In other words, if
federal courts might need to enjoin foreign litigation in order to protect their own jurisdiction, they
may wish to recognize—and defer to—the similar interests of foreign tribunals.
I have previously argued for forum non conveniens to be retired. See Gardner, supra note 29. As I
acknowledged there, however, that option is not a feasible one for the lower courts. See id. at 444–
60 (describing intermediate reforms). Updating the doctrine’s focus and factors would make the
doctrine much more useful. Cf. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 236
(acknowledging the need for a doctrine like forum non conveniens but arguing for an updated and
simplified version).
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I. A TALE OF TWO DISMISSALS
On March 11, 2011, a 9.0-magnitude earthquake struck Japan, triggering
a 45-foot tsunami and a humanitarian disaster.39 The tsunami “flooded the
[Fukushima Daiichi] plant, disabled the generators, and destroyed the
emergency cooling pumps,” such that the plant’s cooling systems could no
longer work properly.40 The plant started leaking radiation that same day;41
four days after the tsunami, the plant’s nuclear reactors exploded.42 Although
the Japanese Government had evacuated those near the plant, the nuclear
disaster made the surrounding communities uninhabitable, forcing more than
1700 businesses to close and contaminating the soil and fish stock of the
region.43 A commission investigating the meltdown on behalf of the Japanese
Government “determined that the meltdown was foreseeable in light of the
known tsunami risks in the region,” making it a “manmade” disaster.44
Japan’s 1961 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage limits liability
to just the plant’s operator (in this case, TEPCO), but it also makes the
operator strictly liable for all damages proximately caused by the disaster,
with no upper limit.45 Claimants may choose among three avenues of redress:
seeking reimbursement for loss directly from TEPCO, for which payment is
based on uniform guidelines; mediating claims through the Nuclear Damage
Claim Dispute Resolution Center; or filing a lawsuit against TEPCO in the
Japanese courts.46 These avenues are not mutually exclusive; a claimant
might submit a direct claim to TEPCO and request mediation at the same

39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2019). More than 15,000 people died from the initial
earthquake and tsunami. Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co. (Cooper III), 860 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th
Cir. 2017). The account that follows is drawn from the judicial decisions, which were themselves
careful to note that they were relying on the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaints, which must be
taken as true at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1197 n.1; Imamura I, 371
F. Supp. 3d at 3. As I have myself argued, one should tread carefully when relying on judicial
opinions to establish facts, Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1619, 1638–45
(2020), especially when those judicial opinions did not themselves purport to determine those facts.
See Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 652–
57 (2015) (urging attention to the standards of review employed in judicial opinions). The following
account, however, is generally not in dispute, and the analysis that follows does not turn on factual
circumstances other than the parameters of the dispute resolution procedures in Japan, which are
set by Japanese law.
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 4.
Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1197.
Imamura II, 957 F.3d 98, 102 (1st Cir. 2020).
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 4–5.
Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1198.
Imamura II, 957 F.3d at 102. There is a ten-year statute of limitations, however, which ran in 2021. Id.
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 5; Imamura II, 957 F.3d at 102.
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time, or might pursue a direct claim first and, if unsatisfied with the result,
pursue litigation after.47 By early 2019, TEPCO had paid approximately
¥8.721 trillion (or roughly $83.5 billion) to claimants, dwarfing its mandated
¥120 billion insurance policy.48 The Japanese Government, through direct
aid and government bonds, has already provided TEPCO with more than
¥8 trillion to pay claims.49 More than 400 lawsuits, 24,000 mediations, and
2,000,000 direct claims were filed in Japan by 2019.50 Some individuals and
businesses harmed by the disaster, however, brought their claims in U.S.
courts instead.
In Imamura, Japanese individuals and businesses from Fukushima
Prefecture sought to represent “classes includ[ing] as many as 150,000
citizens and hundreds of businesses” that suffered property damage and
economic harm from the disaster.51 They sued General Electric in its home
jurisdiction of Massachusetts, alleging negligence, property damage, and
other tort claims under both Massachusetts and Japanese law.52 Judge Patti
Saris of the District of Massachusetts dismissed their complaint for forum
non conveniens in April 2019,53 which the First Circuit affirmed a year later
in an opinion written by Judge Juan Torruella.54
In Cooper, hundreds of U.S. servicemembers who had participated in a
humanitarian relief effort after the earthquake and tsunami sued TEPCO in
the Southern District of California.55 They initially alleged that TEPCO had
mislead the public and the U.S. military regarding radiation risks,56 but Judge
Janis Sammartino dismissed the complaint as raising a nonjusticiable
political question.57 The plaintiffs then recast their claims as asserting
TEPCO’s negligence “in the siting, design, construction, and operation” of
the plant.58 That reframing, the court concluded, avoided the political
47
48
49
50

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 5–6.
Imamura II, 957 F.3d at 103.
Id.
Id. In October 2020, a Japanese court awarded nearly 3,600 Japanese plaintiffs $9.6 million in a
suit against both TEPCO and the Japanese Government. Anthony Kuhn, Landmark Court Ruling in
Japan Holds Government Accountable for 2011 Nuclear Meltdown, NPR, (Oct. 15, 2020, 4:06 PM),
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/924150284 [https://perma.cc/VNV3-4ULE].
Imamura II, 957 F.3d at 104. The complaint was filed in November 2017. Id.
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 6.
Id. at 15.
Imamura II, 957 F.3d at 101. Judges Lynch and Kayatta joined the unanimous decision. Id.
Cooper V, 960 F.3d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 2020).
Cooper III, 860 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017); Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co. (Cooper I), 990 F.
Supp. 2d 1035, 1037 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
Cooper I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 1040, 1042.
Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co. (Cooper II), 166 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2015).
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question problem.59 The court also declined to dismiss the amended
complaint for forum non conveniens or international comity abstention,60
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal.61 When the case
returned to the district court, Judge Sammartino dismissed newly added
claims against General Electric, reasoning that Japanese law applied and
barred any claims against General Electric arising out of the disaster.62 She
then reconsidered her prior ruling, as the Ninth Circuit had invited her to
do, and ultimately dismissed the claims against TEPCO based on
international comity abstention.63 In May 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.64
I do not take issue with the dismissals, as sympathetic as I find the
plaintiffs, but I do take issue with the doctrinal tools available to the judges
for reaching that outcome. This Part critiques the doctrines of forum non
conveniens and international comity abstention as they are currently framed
and as they were applied in these cases. While both doctrines provide judges
with ample discretion to dismiss cases like these, they lack good analytical
guidelines for justifying those decisions. As the next Part will argue, the lower
federal courts could refine these and other doctrines for transnational cases
to make them fit better the questions that judges are confronting.
A. The Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal
Forum non conveniens, as used by the federal courts, has come to focus
primarily on private interests and party convenience. Between changing
technology and changing personal jurisdiction doctrine, however, that focus
is increasingly out-of-date.65 Instead, the public interest factors—interests
that are more keyed to sovereigns’ adjudicatory interests—should now be
driving the analysis. Yet those public interest factors are so poorly articulated
that courts have not been sure what to make of them, resulting in divergent
understandings of what interests should be included. That divergence is
illustrated by the contrast between the forum non conveniens analyses in
Imamura and Cooper.66

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 1115.
Id.
Cooper III, 860 F.3d at 1217.
Cooper IV, No. 12cv3032, 2019 WL 1017266, at *1, 9–10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019).
Id. at *13–15.
Cooper V, 960 F.3d 549, 569 (9th Cir. 2020).
I sketch this argument in subsection I.A.1, but I develop it at greater length in Gardner, supra note
29.
See infra subsection I.A.2.
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1. The Evolution of Forum Non Conveniens
Understanding why the federal test for forum non conveniens is out of
step with its current use requires a brief review of the doctrine’s evolution.
The Scottish and English courts developed the doctrine in the late 1800s and
early 1900s to prevent extreme hardship for defendants who were ensnared
by exorbitant bases of jurisdiction,67 such as the attachment of property
unrelated to the dispute68 or the fleeting presence of a defendant who lived
on the other side of the world69 and who would be required to travel
insuperable distances in an era when they had to physically haul their
evidence with them.70 When the Supreme Court adopted forum non
conveniens in 1947, it was focused on a different problem: that of federal
venue selection in the absence of a mechanism for transferring cases between
federal courts. The Court thus articulated a test that drew on the Scottish
experience but added concerns for internal judicial administration, like docket
congestion and the challenge of “untangl[ing] problems in conflict of laws.”71
All of these problems—exorbitant jurisdiction, the infeasibility of longdistance litigation, the need for venue transfer within the federal system—
have now either been solved72 or significantly ameliorated.73 When the Court
returned to forum non conveniens in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno in 1981, its
decision was not about the vexation of distant defendants or the division of

67
68

69

70

71
72
73

See Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REV. 908, 909–11 (1947)
(chronicling the development of the doctrine by Scottish courts).
See, e.g., Williamson v. Ne. Ry. Co. (1884) 11 R 596, 599 (Scot.) (opinion of Lord Young) (worrying
about “actions by domiciled citizens against foreigners . . . founded on arrestments of small sums of
money or articles of small value, when the circumstances out of which the action has arisen have
no connection whatever with this country”); ANDREW DEWAR GIBB, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 224–25 (1926) (asserting that the Scottish courts
were more amenable to pleas of forum non conveniens when jurisdiction was founded on
attachment).
See, e.g., Egbert v. Short [1907] 2 Ch 205 at 210, 212 (Eng.) (granting dismissal for forum non
conveniens while emphasizing that defendant was served while on vacation in England, shortly
before his return to India).
Id. at 211–12 (worrying about the “grievous injustice” that would befall the defendant if he were
required to defend in England); Logan v. Bank of Scot. (No. 2) [1906] 1 KB 141 at 152–53 (Eng.)
(worrying about harassment of defendant bank if “their officials [are] dragged up to London for a
lengthy trial, . . . and when together with their officials they would have to bring up here, and keep
away from their business, numerous other witnesses with a mass of books, papers and documents”).
See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).
See 28 USC § 1404 (providing for venue transfer).
See supra text accompanying notes 25–29 (discussing Shaffer and Daimler as curtailing exorbitant
jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Davies, supra note 13, at 324–51 (noting how advances in technology have
reduced the difficulties of international litigation); Gardner, supra note 29, at 408–15 (noting the
same).
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labor among the federal courts; to the contrary, the case had already been
transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to one of the defendants’ home forum.74
Rather, Piper used forum non conveniens as a tool for policing plaintiffside forum shopping.75 In doing so, it broke from the original understanding
of forum non conveniens in two important ways: first, the Scottish courts had
used the doctrine to prevent injustice, not just to make litigation easier.76
“Forum non conveniens” does not translate to “inconvenient forum,” but to
“‘inappropriate’ or ‘unsuitable’ forum.”77 Piper, however, leaned into the faux
ami by identifying “the central purpose” of forum non conveniens as
“ensur[ing] that the trial is convenient.”78 Second, the original doctrine of
forum non conveniens—whether applied by Scottish or English courts, U.S.
state courts, or federal courts sitting in admiralty—was limited to cases
involving nonresident defendants.79 That again reflected the early use of the
doctrine as a safety valve for exorbitant bases of personal jurisdiction, a
concern that does not arise with local residents. Yet Piper applied forum non
conveniens to dismiss a case involving just such a local defendant.80
I am not a fan of Piper’s framing of forum non conveniens. But even
accepting that framing, there is a mismatch between the doctrine’s current
use to police plaintiff-side forum shopping in transnational cases, on the one
hand, and the Gulf Oil factors that federal courts still dutifully recite, on the
other.
74

75

76

77
78
79

80

454 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1981); cf. id. at 262 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the question as
“whether the District Court correctly decided that Pennsylvania was not a convenient forum in
which to litigate a claim against a Pennsylvania company that a plane was defectively designed and
manufactured in Pennsylvania”).
See id. at 252 n.18 (majority opinion) (listing reasons why foreign plaintiffs would prefer to litigate in
U.S. courts). The Court was explicit that its concern about forum-shopping applied only to
plaintiffs. See id. at 252 n.19 (“We recognize, of course, that [defendants] Piper and Hartzell may
be engaged in reverse forum-shopping. However, this possibility ordinarily should not enter into a
trial court’s analysis of the private interests.”).
See, e.g., La Société du Gaz de Paris v. La Société Anonyme de Navigation “Les Armateurs
Français” [1926] SC 13 (HL) 19 (appeal taken from Scot.) (opinion of Lord Shaw of Dunmerline)
(stressing that “the mere balance of convenience is not enough” to justify dismissal). Just the year
before it decided Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court had rejected the application of forum non conveniens
in another diversity jurisdiction case because the case was not “vexatious or oppressive” in the sense
emphasized by the English and Scottish authorities. See Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326
U.S. 549, 554 & n.4, 559 (1946).
Gardner, supra note 29, at 414.
Piper, 454 U.S. at 256. On the dangers posed by faux amis, see Bodum USA, Inc., v. La Cafetière,
Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 638–39 (7th Cir. 2010) (Wood, J., concurring).
See Gardner, supra note 29, at 415–16. In rejecting an application of forum non conveniens shortly
before Gulf Oil, the Court linked the necessary vexation and oppression to “[m]aintenance of a suit
away from the domicile of the defendant . . . .” Williams, 326 U.S. at 554.
Piper, 454 U.S. at 239.
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2. Application in Imamura v. General Electric Co.
The need to update the Gulf Oil test is illustrated by the contrast between
the forum non conveniens analyses in Imamura and Cooper. That Imamura was
dismissed for forum non conveniens while Cooper was not is not in itself
surprising, given the current state of the doctrine. First, the Supreme Court
in Piper approved a lesser degree of deference to foreign plaintiffs’ choice of
a U.S. forum.81 That made it easier to dismiss Imamura, which was brought
by foreign plaintiffs, than Cooper, which was brought by U.S. residents.82
Second, while Gulf Oil’s private interest factors are not particularly helpful in
weighing modern-day inconveniences, they will ironically place greater
emphasis on the burden that such discovery imposes on U.S. defendants like
General Electric as compared to foreign defendants like TEPCO. When the
defendant is based in the proposed alternative forum, like TEPCO was in
Cooper, the court can require that defendant to produce the “foreign”
evidence in its possession, a requirement made less burdensome by “the
prevalence of electronic documents and current technology.”83 In contrast,
when U.S. defendants like General Electric assert the need for transnational
discovery, the evidence is less likely to be in the control of a party and thus
will appear more burdensome to the court.84
But the two district courts also applied the public interest factors
differently, even though the public interests should have been similar in the
two cases. The problem is the test: Gulf Oil’s list of public interest factors were
not entirely clear in their original context and were not formulated with
transnational litigation in mind. They thus require a fair amount of adaption
to fit today’s cases, leading to variation among lower courts. The factors
81

82

83
84

Gulf Oil starts from the premise that “unless the balance [of interests] is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 508 (1947). Piper suggested “that the presumption applies with less force when the plaintiff
or real parties in interest are foreign.” Piper, 454 U.S. at 255.
As the Ninth Circuit declared when affirming Cooper II, “Plaintiffs are U.S. citizens, and their
decision to sue in the United States must be respected.” Cooper III, 860 F.3d 1193, 1211 (9th Cir.
2017). That statement may sacrifice some accuracy for rhetorical flair: the relevant distinction is
typically residency, not citizenship, see Maggie Gardner, “Foreignness”, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 477
(2020), and the deference due U.S. residents is strong but not absolute, see Piper, 454 U.S. at 255
n.23.
Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1133–34 (S.D. Cal. 2015).
See, e.g., Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D. Mass. 2019) (finding the private interest factors favor
granting General Electric’s motion to dismiss because “many important documents relating to
TEPCO’s maintenance of the plant and the Japanese government’s response to the disaster are not
in the control of either party and are outside the reach of the Court” and because “[m]ost witnesses
would be current and former TEPCO employees and officers, Japanese government officials, and
Plaintiffs and their associates”).
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break down into three sets of considerations: administrative difficulties,
choice of law, and local interest.85 Taking those considerations in turn,
Imamura applied the administrative difficulties factors fairly literally, focusing
on “court congestion and burden” and finding that the proposed
transnational class action would impose a “heavy burden” on the U.S.
court.86 Cooper instead found these factors to be “neutral” in part because it
took a more comparative approach, noting that “litigating in Japan would
[likewise] impose significant costs on the Japanese judicial system.”87
Regarding choice of law, Imamura emphasized the difficulty of applying
Japanese law; though it acknowledged that the “factor is not dispositive, as
American courts often apply foreign law, it nevertheless points to
dismissal.”88 In Cooper, “the parties d[id] not address this factor,”89 which is
not surprising given the factor’s uncertain relevance in modern forum non
conveniens caselaw. Reflecting that lack of attention, the court assumed that
U.S. law would apply, a conclusion it would later reverse.90
Finally, the courts interpreted the “local interest” factors differently.91
Imamura focused on what I would term the adjudicatory interests of Japan:
the location of the disaster in Japan and its primary impact on Japanese
citizens and businesses; Japan’s extensive investigation and criminal charges
against TEPCO executives; Japan’s demonstrated “interest in determining
how to allocate liability and compensation for [nuclear] disasters,” an
“allocation [that] is key for ensuring that companies are willing to enter the
nuclear power business in Japan and citizens are adequately compensated
when something goes wrong”; and the “international consensus that a
dispute over liability from nuclear disasters should be adjudicated in the
country where it occurs,” as reflected in the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Disaster, which the United States has ratified and
which Japan ratified after the Fukushima disaster.92 In short, the court

85
86
87
88
89
90

91
92

For further discussion of the public interest factors, see subsection II.A.3 below.
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 14–15.
Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 14.
Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1136. I explore further the courts’ different approaches to choice-oflaw considerations in subsection II.A.3 below.
See id. (“In all likelihood, the Court would be applying some version of U.S. law, be it maritime law,
federal common law, or California state law.”); see also Cooper IV, No. 12cv3032, 2019 WL 1017266,
at *11–12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019) (concluding instead that Japanese law would apply to the
dispute).
Compare Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1135–36 (focusing on interests of the United States as
dispositive), with Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (focusing on Japan’s interests as dispositive).
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 14.
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recognized that “[a]djudicating this lawsuit in the United States would
interfere with the system Japan has set up for handling nuclear disasters.”93
In Cooper, by contrast, the court found Japan’s interests to be offset by the
U.S. interest “in seeing that its service members are compensated for their
injuries,” “[e]specially as it is the V.A. system and the U.S. taxpayers who
will ultimately pay for the injuries to Plaintiffs.”94 This emphasis on U.S.
interests reflects Ninth Circuit precedent, which has cast the local interest
factors as asking “only if there is an identifiable local interest in the
controversy, not whether another forum also has an interest.”95
The difference in how these courts understood the public interest factors
may well have mattered. On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district
court in Cooper altered two of its underlying findings: First, once its attention
was focused on the choice-of-law question, it concluded that Japanese law
would apply.96 And second, it reassessed Japan’s interests in the case, placing
greater weight on Japan’s adjudicatory interest in corralling Fukushimarelated cases into its remedial processes.97 In particular, it noted “Japan’s
interest in ensuring there is consistency in how plaintiffs are treated to
guarantee there are ample funds to maintain [that] system.”98 Note that these
two findings—the applicability of Japanese law and Japan’s interest in a
coordinated and consolidated response to the disaster—drove Imamura’s
analysis of the public interest factors. Clearer guidance on how to apply the
public interest factors might thus have altered Cooper’s forum non conveniens
analysis in the first instance. Instead of revisiting that analysis, however,
Cooper revisited its analysis of international comity abstention and ultimately
dismissed the claims against TEPCO on that basis.99

93
94
95
96

97

98
99

Id.
Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.
Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).
Cooper IV, No. 12cv3032, 2019 WL 1017266, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019). The district court
applied California’s governmental interest analysis and concluded that Japan and California each
had a legitimate but conflicting interest in having its law applied. Id. at *7. But Japan’s interest
would be “more impaired” if its law was not applied: California’s primary interest was
compensating resident victims, an interest that could still be achieved through the application of
Japanese law; in contrast, Japan’s interest in allocating liability for nuclear accidents depended on
the “uniform applicability” of its Act on Nuclear Compensation. Id. at *3–9; see also Cooper V, 960
F.3d 549, 560–64 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s reasoning).
See Cooper IV, 2019 WL 1017266, at *14 (noting the Ninth Circuit’s identification of Japan’s
“undeniably strong interest in centralizing jurisdiction over [Fukushima]-related claims” (quoting
Cooper III, 860 F.3d 1193, 1209 (9th Cir. 2017)).
Id.
Id. at *14–15 (citing these two updated considerations as now justifying international comity
abstention); see also Cooper V, 960 F.3d at 556 & n.3 (describing procedural posture).
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I will argue shortly that Cooper’s reliance on international comity
abstention was ill-advised; if the court were going to dismiss the case, it should
have done so on the basis of forum non conveniens. But that does not
necessarily mean that forum non conveniens was the best grounds on which
to dismiss Imamura. Unlike Cooper, Imamura was not really about identifying
the more appropriate forum in which the plaintiffs could sue the defendant.
Rather, it was about whether the plaintiffs could sue their chosen defendant
at all in light of Japanese law shielding that defendant from liability. The
Imamura decision effectively enforced Japanese law by requiring the plaintiffs
to refile in Japan, where (everyone agreed) the plaintiffs would not be able to
sue General Electric.100 Imamura could have addressed that question of
regulatory interests more directly, and better justified its conclusion, if it had
instead dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Indeed, that was the basis on which the district
court in Cooper dismissed similar claims against General Electric.101 General
Electric had asked the district court in Imamura to do the same,102 and as the
district court noted, Massachusetts’ choice-of-law rules did point to the
application of Japanese law.103

100

101
102

103

Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D. Mass. 2019); see also Imamura II, 957 F.3d 98, 110 (1st Cir. 2020)
(acknowledging that Japanese law “may inevitably require the dismissal of the case from Plaintiffs’
chosen forum”).
Cooper IV, 2019 WL 1017266, at *9-10.
See Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. at 6 (listing the grounds for dismissal asserted by General Electric). The
Imamura court was also aware of the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in Cooper. Id. at 14 (citing Cooper IV, 2019
WL 1017266, at *9).
In tort cases, Massachusetts typically applies the law of the forum where the harm occurred. Id. at
14 (citing Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 632 N.E.2d 832, 834 (1994)). Nonetheless,
Massachusetts no longer recognizes a strict lex locus delicti rule, having adopted a more “functional”
approach to choice of law. See Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., Inc., 392 N.E.2d 1045, 104849 (Mass. 1979) (noting a trend toward a “functional approach” in choice of law, including for
Massachusetts tort law); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416, 417 (Mass. 1976) (“But we recognize
that there also may be particular issues on which the interests of lex loci delicti are not so strong.”);
see also Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662, 668-69 (Mass. 1985) (describing
Massachusetts’ approach to choice of law as not “tie[d] . . . to any specific choice-of-law doctrine”
and as “respond[ing] to the interests of the parties, the States involved, and the interstate system as
a whole”). When engaging in this more functional analysis, Massachusetts courts often use the
considerations identified by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, but other sets of factors—like
Professor Leflar’s five choice-influencing considerations—may also be used. See Joseph W. Glannon
& Gabriel Teninbaum, Conflict of Laws in Massachusetts Part I: Current Choice-of-Law Theory, 92 MASS.
L. REV. 12, 14–15 & n.28 (2009) (“As recent cases have confirmed, the current approach in
Massachusetts remains a ‘functional approach’ that is guided by, but not limited to, the Second
Restatement.”). Such considerations would only have reinforced the district court’s conclusion that
Japanese law would apply to the Imamura plaintiffs’ claims.
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Many different considerations enter into a judge’s decision to resolve a
dispute on one ground versus another. In Imamura, General Electric had
raised multiple grounds for dismissal, including a subject-matter jurisdiction
argument based on the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for
Nuclear Damage.104 The Ninth Circuit in Cooper III had previously rejected
the argument that the Convention, which entered into force after the
Fukushima disaster, stripped U.S. courts of jurisdiction over claims regarding
nuclear accidents in other countries.105 It had, however, acknowledged that
the defendants’ argument was “plausible.”106 The district court in Imamura
would have had to first resolve this jurisdictional question for itself in order
to reach the Rule 12(b)(6) argument, which entailed a merits determination.
Dismissing for forum non conveniens, in contrast, allowed the district court
to avoid that jurisdictional question.107
Nonetheless, there would have been several benefits to using choice of
law instead of forum non conveniens to dismiss Imamura. First, dismissing the
case on the merits would have entailed the district court exercising its general
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, in keeping with Daimler’s promise of
providing “at least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate
defendant may be sued on any and all claims.”108 Second, it would also mean
weighing governmental interests through the lens of state choice-of-law rules
rather than through a judicially constructed doctrine. Third, it would have
avoided the Imamura courts’ strained analysis of the adequacy of the Japanese
forum, which could become a problematic precedent. The Imamura plaintiffs
argued that Japan was an inadequate forum because they would be forced in
Japan to switch from suing General Electric to suing TEPCO.109 The district
court and First Circuit dismissed this concern because TEPCO was both
strictly liable under Japanese law and financially backed by the Japanese
government.110 Thus being forced to sue TEPCO instead of GE would not
104
105
106
107

108
109
110

Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 6.
Cooper III, 860 F.3d 1193, 1200–05 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1202.
See Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 6–7 (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 425 (2007)). Another potential benefit to dismissing on the basis of forum non conveniens
rather than Rule 12(b)(6) is that the former is reviewed only for abuse of discretion and may thus
be easier to sustain on appeal. But that difference only underscores the potentially problematic
nature of the Supreme Court’s invitation in Sinochem to invoke a discretionary judge-made doctrine
that is shielded from meaningful appellate review in order to avoid addressing important
jurisdictional questions.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 8.
See Imamura II, 957 F.3d 98, 109 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting that the alternative forum “channels liability
for [the exact same] injuries to a third party who is not the same defendant in the U.S. case”);
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alter the Imamura plaintiffs’ ability to establish liability or obtain
compensation. But the language that the courts used to explain this
equivalency was at times quite broad, for example emphasizing that Japan
still provided “adequate remedies for the exact same injuries,” just against a
different party.111 Such language is worrisome because the concept of an
“adequate remedy” in the forum non conveniens context has already been
set as a low bar, requiring only that the remedy is not “so clearly inadequate
or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.”112 If the link to strict liability and
financial solvency is not maintained, then future decisions might misapply
Imamura as only requiring some relief to be available against some defendant,
even if that alternative defendant is less responsible, liable for a lesser
amount, or less capable of paying any resulting judgment than the plaintiff’s
preferred defendant.
In sum, the use of forum non conveniens in Imamura to address what at
root was a choice-of-law problem may encourage more expansive
application of forum non conveniens in future cases, while the difference in
application of forum non conveniens in Imamura and Cooper illustrates the
current inadequacy of the doctrine’s public interest factors.
B. The “International Comity Abstention” Dismissal
Instead of dismissing for forum non conveniens, the Southern District of
California in Cooper ultimately dismissed the claims against TEPCO on the
basis of international comity abstention.113 The version of international
comity abstention it used is both novel and highly discretionary. This Section
distinguishes that version from other versions of “international comity
abstention” before arguing that its application in Cooper expanded even
further the scope of federal judges’ discretion to rid themselves of
transnational cases.

111

112

113

Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 9 (“TEPCO’s unlimited liability and the financial support of the
Japanese government ensure that TEPCO will continue to be able to pay compensation via judicial
and administrative mechanisms.”).
Imamura II, 957 F.3d at 109; see also Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 8–9 (suggesting that the foreign
forum need not “permit a remedy against the specific defendant” chosen by the plaintiff so long as
it provides “an adequate remedy from another party or entity”).
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981); see also Kevin M. Clermont, The Story of
Piper: Forum Matters, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 199, 215–16 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed.
2008) (explaining why this language is illogical and ill-advised).
Cooper IV, No. 12cv3032, 2019 WL 1017266, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019).
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1. The Many Doctrines of “International Comity Abstention”
“International comity abstention” has been invoked by federal courts to
address at least five different questions: whether to defer to foreign parallel
proceedings, whether to defer to foreign bankruptcy proceedings, whether to
recognize and enforce foreign judgments, how to interpret the geographic
reach of federal statutes, and whether to abstain in light of foreign relations
concerns.114 It is a problem that all of these analyses are at times referred to
as international comity abstention or close variants thereof,115 as the courts
do not always distinguish carefully among them. This doctrinal confusion
seems to have originated with the Eleventh Circuit and its 1994 decision in
Turner Entertainment v. Degeto Film GmbH, which coined the label of
“international comity . . . abstention.”116 In defining this new concept, Turner
mixed together what had previously been two distinct lines of precedent: the
enforcement of foreign judgments and deference to foreign parallel
proceedings.117 After Turner, other circuits applied the new label to existing
lines of precedent. The Second Circuit, for example, has adopted the label
of “international comity abstention” when discussing deference to foreign
parallel proceedings,118 deference to foreign bankruptcy proceedings,119 and
the interpretation of statutes.120 The bulk of the federal appellate decisions
discussing comity-based abstention focus on similar questions.121
Two circuits, however, have invoked “international comity abstention”
to dismiss cases based on foreign relations concerns. In Ungaro-Benages v.
Dresdner Bank AG, the Eleventh Circuit in 2004 distinguished Turner’s
“retrospective[]” comity analysis from a concern for what it termed
“prospective[]” comity.122 “When applied prospectively,” the Eleventh
Circuit explained, international comity abstention allows courts to stay or
dismiss a case “based on the interests of our government, the foreign
government and the international community in resolving the dispute in a
foreign forum.”123 Ungaro-Benages was a Holocaust restitution case brought in

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

For further discussion and examples of each, see below Part II.
See Gardner, supra note 13, at 69 n.26 (gathering variations in labels).
25 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (referring to “international comity, in the abstention context”).
Id. at 1519–22.
Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2006).
JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 422, 425 (2d Cir. 2005).
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2112 (2015).
379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1238.
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a U.S. court against two German banks, despite an agreement between
Germany and the United States meant to channel such claims through an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism established by Germany.124 The
district court held that the bilateral agreement rendered the case a
nonjusticiable political question, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
emphasizing Baker v. Carr’s warning that “not all issues that could potentially
have consequences to our foreign relations are political questions.”125 Yet the
appellate court was still uneasy about allowing the case to go forward,
especially in light of the German interest in having an “exclusive forum for
these claims in its efforts to achieve lasting legal peace . . . .”126 Expanding
Turner’s conception of comity-based abstention to encompass foreign
relations concerns provided the Eleventh Circuit with a way out of that
conundrum.
Ten years later, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Ungaro-Benages
was basically sui generis, and it “reserved prospective international comity
abstention for rare (indeed often calamitous) cases in which powerful
diplomatic interests of the United States and foreign sovereigns [are] aligned
in supporting dismissal.”127 In doing so, it stressed that none of the three
Second Circuit decisions on which Ungaro-Benages relied had actually applied
such “prospective international comity” to dismiss a case.128 Meanwhile, the
Third Circuit in another Holocaust restitution case specifically rejected
Ungaro-Benages’s solution, pointing out that the federal courts’ duty to exercise
their congressionally granted jurisdiction “is not diminished simply because
foreign relations might be involved.”129 The Supreme Court recently avoided
addressing that circuit split in yet another Holocaust restitution case.130
Only the Ninth Circuit has followed Ungaro-Benages, which it did in the
2014 case of Mujica v. Airscan Inc.131 As Mujica abstention is growing in
prominence,132 it is important to chart that case’s questionable procedural

124
125
126
127
128
129
130

131
132

See id. at 1231.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1239.
GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1030–31, 1034 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1031.
Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 394 (3d Cir. 2006).
See Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, No. 19-351, slip op. at 15–16 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“We do
not address Germany’s argument that the District Court was obligated to abstain from deciding the
case on international comity grounds.”).
771 F.3d 580, 615 (9th Cir. 2014).
It was effectively Mujica’s version of abstention that the Supreme Court was being asked to recognize
in Philipp. See Pet. Br. at 43, Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, No. 19-351 (invoking Mujica
and Ungaro-Benages).

December 2021]

DEFERRING TO FOREIGN COURTS

2249

progression. In Mujica, Colombian plaintiffs sued two American corporations
over their involvement in a bombing and armed attack by government forces
on the plaintiffs’ town.133 The U.S. companies moved to dismiss for forum
non conveniens and “[i]nternational [c]omity,”134 among other grounds.
Judge William Rea of the Central District of California reasoned that
Colombia was not an available alternative forum because the plaintiffs,
having successfully pursued an administrative remedy against the
government, would be barred from bringing a separate suit against the U.S.
defendants.135 Even if Colombia could provide an adequate forum, the court
also concluded that the balance of factors weighed in favor of the plaintiffs
and would additionally prevent dismissal for forum non conveniens.136 The
district court considered and rejected application of the Ninth Circuit’s
existing “international abstention” doctrine, which it correctly identified as
being limited to foreign parallel proceedings.137 It even considered UngaroBenages’s three-part test for abstention and acknowledged that both the
United States and Colombia had expressed an interest in the case being
dismissed, but it reasoned that the availability of an adequate forum was also
a prerequisite for such foreignr elations-based abstention.138 Nonetheless, the
district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims under the political question
doctrine.139
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially remanded the case solely to
determine whether the plaintiffs’ Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) claims required
exhaustion.140 Because Judge Rea had died in the interim, a new judge, Judge
George Wu, was assigned the case on remand.141 While noting that the
appellate court had not yet addressed the district court’s ruling of nonjusticiability, Judge Wu concluded that prudential exhaustion was not
required for the plaintiffs’ ATS claims.142 But if it were, he continued doubly
hypothetically, the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that pursuing local
remedies would be futile.143

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
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143

Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1147–48.
Id. at 1154.
See id. at 1157–59 (applying Colorado River framework).
Id. at 1161–63.
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194–95 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Mujica v. Airscan Inc., 564 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009).
Mujica v. Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2014).
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, No. 03-2860, 2010 WL 11586833, at *2–3, *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2010).
Id. at *9–10.
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The parties returned to the Ninth Circuit, which dismissed the ATS
claims—regardless of any exhaustion requirement—based on its reading of
the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.144 It then skipped over Judge Rea’s forum non conveniens and political
question determinations, which is telling: given the thoroughness of Judge
Rea’s forum non conveniens analysis and his close adherence to Ninth
Circuit precedent, the panel would have been hard-pressed to identify any
abuse of discretion. But if forum non conveniens did not provide an avenue
to dismissal, neither did the political question doctrine. Judge Rea based his
political question determination primarily on a concern for a “lack of respect
for coordinate branches,” given the Executive’s statement of interest that it
would prefer that the court not hear the case.145 The Executive’s preference,
however, does not alone make the question non-justiciable.146 Caught
between the district court’s careful exercise of discretion under an updated
forum non conveniens framework and the Supreme Court’s direction not to
use the political question doctrine to avoid foreign relations
entanglements,147 the Mujica majority created a new discretionary doctrine
to do precisely that.
In an opinion authored by Judge Jay Bybee, the panel majority adopted
Ungaro-Benages’s tripartite framework but expanded it to include numerous
subfactors,148 which it then applied to dismiss the plaintiffs’ remaining statelaw claims. Notably, the appellate court did not remand to the district court
to apply this expanded test in the first instance. To work around Judge Rea’s
prior finding that the defendants had not established an available alternative
forum, the panel majority held that Judge Rea’s finding of unavailability had
been replaced by Judge Wu’s conclusion—for purposes of a hypothetical
ATS exhaustion requirement—that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the
144
145

146
147
148

Mujica, 771 F.3d at 591 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013)).
See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194–95 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(“[T]his case involves foreign relations, an area over which the Executive has a great deal of
responsibility,” such that “proceeding with the litigation would indicate a ‘lack of respect’ for the
Executive’s preferred approach” to handling the incident).
See Mujica, 771 F.3d at 616 n.4 (Zilly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (identifying how the
case implicated none of the factors of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”).
See Mujica, 771 F.3d at 603–08 (considering the location of the conduct; the nationality of the parties;
the character of the conduct in question; the foreign policy interests of the United States; any public
policy interests; U.S. state interests; the activity’s effects; the interests of the foreign state; whether
the judgment was rendered via fraud; whether the judgment was rendered by a competent court
utilizing proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and whether the foreign judgment is
prejudicial and repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just).
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futility of pursuing relief in Colombian courts.149 As the dissent pointed out,
this was “dictum that was uttered for an entirely different purpose,
concerning a wholly separate legal doctrine”—and applying an opposite
burden of proof.150
In sum, while other circuits have rejected or moved away from foreign
relations-based abstention, the Ninth Circuit alone has embraced it as a
means for increasing judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction beyond that
already provided by forum non conveniens and the political question
doctrine. That story would repeat itself in Cooper.
2. Application in Cooper v. TEPCO
Cooper provided the Ninth Circuit with its first opportunity to apply its
new version of international comity abstention after Mujica. Initially, Judge
Sammartino declined to dismiss Cooper for forum non conveniens or
international comity abstention, noting that neither Japan nor the United
States had “expressed interest in the location of this litigation.”151 When that
decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, however, Japan did weigh in,
prompting the appellate court to solicit the views of the United States as
well.152 As summarized by the Ninth Circuit, Japan “present[ed] a
compelling case that [Fukushima]-related claims brought outside of Japan
threaten the viability of Japan’s [Fukushima] compensation scheme,”153 with
litigation outside of Japan potentially leading to “different outcomes for
similarly situated victims” and “[j]udgments . . . inconsistent with the overall
administration of Japan’s compensation fund.”154 The United States was
more ambivalent; while it supported those efforts by Japan, it also worried
about discouraging additional countries from ratifying the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,155 which guarantees
that litigation will be funneled to the country in which a nuclear accident
occurred. Because Japan did not join the agreement until after the
Fukushima disaster, the United States questioned whether Japan should

149
150

151
152
153
154
155

Id. at 612–13.
Id. at 622 (Zilly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Simon v. Republic of Hungary,
911 F.3d 1172, 1184–85 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (concluding that the district court committed error when
it applied its finding of forum availability for exhaustion purposes to its forum non conveniens
analysis, given that the two questions bear opposite burdens of proof).
Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1137–40 (S.D. Cal. 2015).
Cooper III, 860 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1207–08.
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receive the benefit of the agreement without having borne its costs
beforehand.156
Notwithstanding these interventions, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision not to dismiss. But in an opinion authored by Judge
Bybee, it emphasized that international comity abstention “is a more fluid
doctrine, one that may change in the course of the litigation.”157 “Should
either the facts or the interests of the governments change—particularly the
interests of the United States—the district court would be free to revisit this
question,”158 it encouraged. Back before the district court, TEPCO did not
wait long to argue for reconsideration.159 The district court agreed that two
circumstances had changed: First, it undertook a full choice-of-law analysis
and concluded Japanese law would apply to the dispute.160 And second, it
now had statements from both Japan and the United States regarding their
interest in the litigation.161 Between the applicability of Japanese law and the
strength of the newly elucidated interests of Japan, the district court
determined that “the factors now weigh in favor of dismissal” on the basis of
international comity abstention.162 The Ninth Circuit, in another opinion
authored by Judge Bybee, affirmed.163
Two aspects of this exercise of judicial discretion are worth highlighting.
First, the district court’s initial analysis of forum non conveniens and
international comity abstention overlapped significantly, so much so that the
two grounds on which it reconsidered its international comity abstention
decision applied equally to its prior analysis of the public interest factors
under forum non conveniens.164 In other words, forum non conveniens is
largely redundant with the Ninth Circuit’s version of international comity
abstention. The difference is that Mujica’s version of international comity
abstention excises any deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. If the
156
157
158

159
160

161
162
163
164

Id.
Id. at 1210. The panel also included Judges Tashima and Wardlaw.
Id. at 1210 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit repeated the message at the beginning and end of
its opinion as well. See id. at 1197 (“Further developments, however, may require the district court
to revisit some of the issues that TEPCO raised in its motion to dismiss.”); id. at 1218 (“As the case
develops more fully, . . . the district may reconsider dismissal as a matter of comity . . .”).
Cooper IV, No. 12cv3032, 2019 WL 1017266, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019).
See id. at *11–14 (“Japan has an overwhelmingly strong interest in applying its laws in this case, and
because those interests would be more impaired than California’s, the Court determines that
Japanese law applies to the issue of TEPCO’s liability.”).
See id. at *14 (discussing government interventions).
Id. at *15. As previously discussed, the court also dismissed newly added claims against General
Electric for failure to state a claim under Japanese law.
Cooper V, 960 F.3d 549, 569 (9th Cir. 2020). The panel was the same as the first appeal.
See supra text accompanying notes 91–99 (discussing Cooper’s analysis of the public interest factors).
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district court had instead revisited its forum non conveniens holding in light
of these two changed considerations, that would have forced a direct
confrontation of the two major intuitions competing in Cooper: sympathy for
local servicemembers and the strong adjudicatory interests of Japan in
consolidating Fukushima-related claims.165 I think reasonable minds could
differ as to which set of interests should have won out in Cooper, but it would
have been beneficial for the court to address that trade-off directly, as forum
non conveniens would have required it to do.
Second, Cooper appears to be the first time that a federal court has
dismissed a case for foreign relations abstention absent a request from the
Executive Branch.166 In contrast, both Mujica and Ungaro-Benages relied on
U.S. statements of interest that urged dismissal.167 Cooper, then, suggests a
more expansive doctrine, one that allows federal judges to dismiss cases
assigned to them by Congress and against the wishes of the Executive.
Cooper also illustrates how the need for such expansive judicial discretion
is in fact decreasing as the case could instead have been dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction. TEPCO’s contacts with California were limited to its
registration to do business within the state between 2003 and 2006,168
contacts that have no obvious relationship to the management of the
Fukushima plant and its 2011 meltdown. While Cooper was pending on
interlocutory appeal in 2017, the plaintiffs’ attorneys filed a new action,
styled Bartel v. Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., with different named plaintiffs.169
TEPCO moved to dismiss Bartel for lack of personal jurisdiction in light of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of
California.170 Judge Sammartino granted the motion, reasoning that the
plaintiffs’ injuries did not arise out of or relate to TEPCO’s limited contacts
with California.171 TEPCO then raised the same personal jurisdiction
defense in Cooper, arguing that the defense was not available before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb.172 But Judge Sammartino
165

166
167
168
169
170
171
172

It does not appear, however, that TEPCO requested reconsideration of the forum non conveniens
determination. See Cooper IV, 2019 WL 1017266, at *10 (describing the grounds included in
TEPCO’s motion to dismiss).
See Cooper III, 860 F.3d 1193, 1207–09 & 1210 n.13 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting the ambivalent position
of the United States).
Mujica v. Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 609–10 (9th Cir. 2014); Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank
AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004).
Bartel v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., No. 17-1671, 2018 WL 312701, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018).
Id.
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
Bartel, 2018 WL 312701, at *7.
Cooper IV, No. 12cv3032, 2019 WL 1017266, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019).
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reasonably held that the defense was waived, explaining that TEPCO’s
connection with California was so tenuous, a personal jurisdiction defense
was viable even under the Ninth Circuit’s pre-Bristol-Myers Squibb “sliding
scale” approach.173 TEPCO, in other words, missed the easiest route to
dismissal. International comity abstention thus served in Cooper to address
adjudicative comity concerns that existing personal jurisdiction doctrine
already works to avoid.
II. A Roadmap to Transnational Abstention
As the Fukushima cases suggest, these doctrines are in flux, providing
opportunities for reform and refinement. This Part draws on developments
across the lower federal courts to clarify the different bases for transnational
abstention and to suggest how judges can improve those abstention doctrines
in concrete terms. Given this practical perspective, it starts with the
frameworks that currently govern and identifies possible modifications to
them. In general, the roadmap favors simpler tests, clear and current factors,
and tractable considerations, all of which will encourage the exercise of
discretion in a manner that is transparent, manageable, and less prone to
expansion.174 The Fukushima cases also illustrate how a greater emphasis on
adjudicatory interests may better guide discretion and justify its exercise. In
particular, as the federal courts’ experience with cross-border bankruptcies
illustrates,175 there is sometimes a need to accommodate the interests of
foreign states in consolidating interdependent claims within one forum. Even
if one is not persuaded by the need for greater attention to adjudicatory
interests, however, the roadmap’s efforts to disentangle and clarify lower
federal courts’ invocations of abstention should still be of use.
A. Forum Non Conveniens
I have argued before that the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens176
has outlived its usefulness and should enter a phased retirement: on the one
173
174
175
176

Id. at *11. The Ninth Circuit did not reach this issue on appeal. Cooper V, 960 F.3d 549, 569
n.15 (9th Cir. 2020).
See Gardner, supra note 30, at 1006–09 (discussing procedural design considerations); Gardner, supra
note 13, at 90–93 (same).
See infra Section II.C.
My focus in my prior work, as well as here, is on the use of forum non conveniens by federal courts
to dismiss cases in favor of foreign forums. State courts have a greater need than federal courts to
dismiss cases they believe should be brought in other U.S. states, a lesser duty to provide forums for
foreign litigants, and no constitutional presumption in favor of exercising legislative grants of
jurisdiction. See Gardner, supra note 29, at 400 (noting differences between state and federal uses of
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hand, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of modern transnational
litigation by curtailing exorbitant assertions of attachment and “doing
business” jurisdiction, circumscribing specific jurisdiction, reining in the
Alien Tort Statute, and redeploying the presumption against
extraterritoriality; on the other hand, transportation and communication
technologies have fundamentally altered the calculus of long-distance
litigation burdens.177 Radically altering or retiring forum non conveniens,
however, will require Supreme Court or congressional intervention. As the
focus here is on what the lower federal courts can do, this discussion centers
instead on how to improve the current federal doctrine.178
The lower courts have already modified the Gulf Oil test, though their
approach varies by circuit.179 Given developments in technology and
personal jurisdiction doctrine, courts may find the private interest factors
playing a less dominant role in the analysis. That will increase the importance
of the public interest factors, which need clarification and refinement.180
Ideally that clarification and refinement will help focus the public interest
factors on comparing adjudicative interests. This Section gathers lower court
developments and maps a modern test for forum non conveniens that has

177

178
179

180

forum non conveniens). To the extent that states have adopted Gulf Oil’s framework, however, state
court judges may be interested in how federal judges have been updating that test.
Particularly after Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court, 571 U.S. 49 (2013), federal courts
also use forum non conveniens to enforce forum selection clauses that point to U.S. state courts. As
Atlantic Marine suggests, however, that use of forum non conveniens is more automatic, depending
less on case-by-case application of the Gulf Oil factors. See Robin Effron, Atlantic Marine and the
Future of Forum Non Conveniens, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 713–18 (2015) (critiquing Atlantic Marine on
this basis). Reforms to the federal doctrine can thus focus on its use in transnational litigation.
See generally Gardner, supra note 29, at 405–15, 429–42 (making these arguments). For additional
thoughtful critiques and reforms, see Clermont, supra note 112; Davies, supra note 13; Lear, supra
note 31; Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 781 (1985).
Cf. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 236 (acknowledging that a doctrine like
forum non conveniens is needed but suggesting reforms to the current doctrine).
Many of these variations are discussed further below. For a few preliminary examples, consider that
the Ninth Circuit has added two additional private interest factors, see Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp.,
236 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001) (listing “the residence of the parties and the witnesses” and
“the forum’s convenience to the litigants”); that the Tenth Circuit has added a threshold
requirement that dismissal is only proper if foreign law will apply to the dispute, see, e.g., Fireman’s
Fund Ins. v. Thyssen Mining Constr. of Can. Ltd., 703 F.3d 488, 495 (10th Cir. 2012); and that
the Eleventh Circuit at times has considered a simplified set of public interest factors, see, e.g., Otto
Candies, LLC v. Citigroup, Inc., 963 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Public interests include a
sovereign’s interests in deciding the dispute, the administrative burdens posed by trial, and the need
to apply foreign law.”).
See supra subsection I.A.2 (comparing the public interest analysis in Imamura and Cooper).

2256

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

simpler presumptions, updated private interest factors, and public interest
factors that are easier to apply.
1. Simplifying the Threshold Inquiries
The federal doctrine of forum non conveniens is currently understood to
include two threshold inquiries: whether there is an adequate and available
alternative forum and whether the plaintiff’s choice of forum should receive
less deference because the plaintiff is “foreign.”181 Both of these inquiries
have grown complex, yet that complexity is not adding value. The problem
is the inquiries’ binary format, which does not allow judges to provide
nuanced answers. The solution is to shift many of these considerations to the
weighing of private interests, returning both threshold inquiries to the
simplicity of their original formulations: Piper’s minimalist identification of an
alternative forum and Gulf Oil’s strong default presumption in favor of the
plaintiff’s choice of forum.
Piper required that there be an available alternative forum not as a
protection for plaintiffs, but as a reminder to lower courts to ignore
substantive changes in law between the two forums.182 Piper thus defined an
available forum as one where (i) the defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction and (ii) “where the remedy offered” is not “clearly
unsatisfactory,” for example because the “alternative forum does not permit
litigation of the subject matter of the dispute” or because it “amounts to no
remedy at all.”183 Despite the minimalist framing of this inquiry, plaintiffs
have identified a range of reasons why foreign forums may not be adequate
or meaningfully available, including evidence of corruption, bias, safety
concerns, delay, lack of contingency fees or jury trials, lack of comparable
causes of action, or—as in Imamura—the inability to sue the plaintiffs’ chosen
defendant.184 But the inquiry is not structured as a case-specific analysis;
rather, judges worry they are being asked to declare the entire court system
of another country “inadequate,” which they are understandably unwilling
to do.185
A simpler approach is to consider the plaintiff’s concerns about the
alternative forum as part of the private interest analysis, as the Second Circuit
181
182
183
184
185

See, e.g., Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7, 11 (D. Mass. 2019).
See Clermont, supra note 112, at 215–18.
Piper, 454 U.S. 235, 254 & n.22 (1981).
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 37, at 423–27 (gathering examples of concerns raised about the
adequacy of foreign forums).
See Gardner, supra note 30, at 989 n.250 (collecting cases).
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has done.186 Doing so allows judges to take such concerns seriously without
casting broad aspersions on the legal systems of other countries.187 The
alternative forum inquiry would then revert to serving a practical but
minimal purpose: identifying the forum whose adjudicatory interests the
remainder of the analysis will contrast to those of the United States.
Piper also complicated Gulf Oil’s strong default presumption in favor of the
plaintiff’s choice of forum by suggesting that a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a
U.S. forum should receive “less deference.”188 This differential presumption
has been the subject of extensive criticism, which will not be repeated here.189
But of particular relevance is the criticism that the differential presumption
is simply not practical, as the binary distinction between “foreign” and
“local” plaintiffs falls apart on closer inspection.190 In an attempt to avoid this
false dichotomy, the Second Circuit has adopted a sliding scale approach,
under which “[t]he more it appears that a domestic or foreign plaintiff’s
choice of forum has been dictated by reasons that the law recognizes as valid,
the greater the deference that will be given to the plaintiff’s forum choice.”191
Other federal circuits have followed suit.192 While an improvement to Piper’s
oversimplified line-drawing, however, the sliding scale approach effectively

186
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188
189

190

191
192

See, e.g., Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (directing courts within the
private interest factors to “consider how great would be the inconvenience and difficulty imposed
on the plaintiffs were they forced to litigate in” the alternative forum, in particular the plaintiffs’
“fear for their safety” there).
This difference in locating plaintiff concerns explains “how judges have reached seemingly
inconsistent conclusions about whether it is too dangerous or emotionally fraught to send plaintiffs
to litigate in Pakistan, in Eqypt, and in Cali, Colombia.” Gardner, supra note 29, at 447 (footnotes
omitted) (collecting cases).
Piper, 454 U.S. at 255–56.
For Professor Burbank’s criticisms, see for example Burbank, Paths to a Via Media?, supra note 16, at
395 (emphasizing perception among allies that U.S. doctrine discriminates against foreign parties).
For mine, see Gardner, supra note 30, at 990–94.
See Gardner, supra note 30, at 991–92 (gathering cases considering whether U.S. plaintiffs should
receive regular or decreased deference when they sue alongside foreign plaintiffs, do significant
business in foreign countries, are only nominally incorporated in the United States, or initially
brought suit in the foreign forum); Gardner, supra note 82, at 477–78 (noting cases where lawful
permanent residents or naturalized citizens received decreased deference); see also Clermont, supra
note 112, at 219 (“It is difficult to mesh a bifurcated . . . presumption with a flexible balancing
doctrine. Bifurcation is an on/off switch that will create discontinuities in result.”).
Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 71–72.
See, e.g., Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2016); Shi v. New
Mighty U.S. Trust, 918 F.3d 944, 949–50 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that “certain considerations may
make litigation in a U.S. court the most convenient choice even for foreign plaintiffs” and applying
Iragorri’s reasoning in adopting an intermediate level of deference to foreign plaintiff’s decision to
sue in D.C.).
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moves the weighing of the private interest factors into a threshold inquiry.193
That risks a circular analysis, with the starting presumption turning on the
strength of the private interest factors, which are supposed to be weighed in
light of the starting presumption.
The better solution is to revert to the simple, strong presumption of Gulf
Oil and to account for the plaintiff’s foreign residency or forum-shopping
motives when weighing the private interest factors. A strong threshold
presumption in favor of exercising jurisdiction, regardless of where the
plaintiff resides, recognizes the federal courts’ virtually unflagging obligation
to exercise their subject matter jurisdiction; it also acknowledges that the
United States will almost always have an adjudicatory interest in cases in
which a federal court has personal jurisdiction under today’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine.194 The private interest factors, meanwhile, can better
accommodate the infinite variation in plaintiffs’ degree of connection to the
forum and their motivations for choosing it.
Even if lower courts are not able to disregard entirely Piper’s differential
presumption, they can shift their discussion of the plaintiffs’ residency and
convenience to the private interest factors, as some circuits have already
done.195 Doing so simplifies the threshold inquiries, allows for a more
nuanced evaluation of plaintiffs’ concerns, and enables a direct comparison
of plaintiff and defendant interests.
2. Updating the Private Interest Factors
Three sets of reforms are already helping to update and streamline the private
interest factors. First, as noted above, courts are integrating consideration of
plaintiffs’ interests more explicitly into the private interest analysis. The Second,196

193

194

195
196

See Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72 (noting as relevant to the sliding scale approach considerations like “the
availability of witnesses or evidence” and “the inconvenience or expense to the defendant,” which
echo the private interest factors); see also Gardner, supra note 29, at 480–81 (critiquing sliding scale
approach on this basis).
While federal courts can dismiss for forum non conveniens before resolving questions of subject
matter or personal jurisdiction, see Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.
422, 425 (2007), such dismissals are still based on the assumption that the court has proper
jurisdiction over the dispute. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marahon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999)
(explaining hypothetical jurisdiction).
See infra subsection II.A.2.
See, e.g., Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 75 (citing plaintiff’s safety-based fears of litigating in the foreign
jurisdiction as a factor to be considered when “assessing where the greater convenience lies”); Guidi
v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 2000) (weighing the “emotional
burden on Plaintiffs of returning to the country where they or their loved ones were shot in an act
of religious terrorism”).
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Fourth,197 Sixth,198 Eighth199, and Ninth Circuits,200 for example, have directed
courts to weigh plaintiffs’ residency, safety concerns, and practical considerations
alongside defendants’ interests.
Second, courts are decreasing the weight of the discovery-related factors.
Gulf Oil defined private interests almost entirely in terms of evidence: the
“relative ease of access to sources of proof,” the “availability of compulsory
process” for unwilling witnesses, the “cost of obtaining attendance of willing”
witnesses, and the “possibility of view of premises.”201 Multiple factors
addressing one issue are not only unnecessary, but they can also unduly
increase the weight placed on the issue.202 The jury view factor is often not
mentioned at all203 and should be dropped as a distinct factor, particularly
given how rarely jury views are used by federal courts.204 Courts have also
downplayed concerns about cross-border discovery and travel for willing
witnesses, given modern communication and transportation technology,205
and they have noted that such concerns will often be a wash in today’s
transnational cases, given that litigation will be inconvenient no matter where
the case is tried.206 The district court in Cooper, for example, noted that

197
198
199

200
201
202
203
204
205

206

See, e.g., DiFederico v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 804 (4th Cir. 2013) (crediting, among other
factors, “risks facing Americans who travel anywhere in Pakistan”).
See, e.g., Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 499 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that “a
plaintiff’s financial ability to practicably bring suit in the alternative forum” is a relevant consideration).
See, e.g., Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1398–1400 (8th Cir. 1991) (addressing “practical
problems likely to be encountered by plaintiffs in litigating their claim . . . in a foreign country”
within the private interest factors).
See, e.g., Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering the residence
and convenience of all parties within the private interest factors).
Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
See Gardner, supra note 29, at 420–21 (describing how the effects of salience and satisficing combine
to overweight these evidentiary factors).
E.g., Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1145.
See Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1399 (questioning why a jury view would be needed, given photographic
evidence); DiFederico v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 806 (4th Cir. 2013) (similar).
Shi v. New Mighty U.S. Trust, 918 F.3d 944, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Logistical hurdles to obtaining
evidence and voluntary testimony in the United States present less of a problem than they used to
in light of technological advances and the ease of international travel.”); Simon, 911 F.3d at 1186
(“At best, the location-of-the-evidence factor is in equipoise.”); Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1397 (“[T]he
time and expense of obtaining the presence or testimony of foreign witnesses is greatly reduced by
commonplace modes of communication and travel.”).
See, e.g., Shi, 918 F.3d at 951 (“To the extent translation is considered a significant obstacle in this
day and age, that obstacle will exist regardless of where this case is tried.”); Simon, 911 F.3d at 1186
(similar); Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting
neutrality of convenience considerations when logistical challenges would be present in either
forum); Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1181 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Any court,
whether in the United States or in the Philippines, will necessarily face some difficulty in securing
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“[b]ecause of the nature of international litigation, each side would incur
expenses related to traveling and procuring witnesses in either forum” and
“many of the obstacles” of transnational discovery will “be present no matter
where the litigation takes place.”207
The one evidentiary challenge that modern technology cannot solve is
that of unwilling witnesses, as courts can only compel attendance by
individuals within their jurisdiction. Defendants thus have an incentive to
assert categories of potential witnesses who are in other countries and outside
of their control.208 To counter that incentive, at least six circuits have required
defendants to provide some degree of specificity to support such assertions,
whether by identifying specific non-willing witnesses, providing some
indication that they are in fact unwilling to appear voluntarily, or
demonstrating that the alternative forum will not face the same difficulty in
reverse.209 Similar care should be taken when evaluating defendants’
assertions that they cannot implead third-party defendants in the U.S.
forum.210
Third, at least six circuits have indicated that the plaintiff’s choice of the
defendant’s home forum weighs heavily against forum non conveniens

207
208
209

210

evidence from abroad.”); Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1397 (“In whichever forum the case is tried,
witnesses will have to travel or testify by deposition.”).
Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1134–35 (S.D. Cal. 2015).
Cf. Gardner, supra note 30, at 987–88 (explaining why judges may be tempted to rely on defendants’
general assertions regarding evidentiary burdens).
Otto Candies, LLC v. Citigroup, Inc., 963 F.3d 1331, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[The defendant’s]
contentions about the location of key evidence and witnesses may well be plausible. They may even
be correct. But [the defendant] failed to support those contentions with positive evidence . . ., and
therefore failed to carry its burden.”); Simon, 911 F.3d at 1186 (faulting the defendant for not
identifying “a single witness in Hungary that would need to testify at trial”); Hefferan v. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 498–99 (6th Cir. 2016) (requiring a searching inquiry into what
evidence, including non-willing witnesses, will actually be needed); Shi, 918 F.3d at 951 (noting that
the greater problem is the number of unwilling witnesses in the United States that the plaintiff
would need to call); Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1231 (requiring more than the mere assertion of unwilling
witnesses); DiFederico, 714 F.3d at 806 (noting that the factor of unwillingness of witnesses “should be
given little weight . . . when the defendant has not shown that any witness is actually unwilling to testify”);
Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1396–97 (similar). While Piper cautioned that affidavits identifying specific
witnesses and their proposed testimony should not be required, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 258 (1981), circuit courts have reasoned that they can still require at least as much information as
the defendants in Piper in fact provided. E.g., Otto Candies, 963 F.3d at 1347.
See Simon, 911 F.3d at 1187 (stressing that the ability to implead third-party defendants is only
relevant if they will be “crucial” to the presentation of the defense or the shifting of liability); ReidWalen, 933 F.2d at 1398 (rejecting defendant’s argument that it needed to implead the person
allegedly responsible for the accident because the plaintiffs’ claims turned on the defendant’s duty
to provide a safe environment regardless of fault for the underlying accident).
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dismissal.211 This makes sense for a number of reasons. First, suing a
defendant in its home forum significantly ameliorates fairness and
convenience concerns: local defendants are not “vexed” or “harassed” by the
assertion of their home forum’s jurisdiction,212 and they do not face the
insuperable challenges of litigating far from home that originally motivated
Scottish courts to formulate forum non conveniens.213 Second, sovereigns
have an interest in adjudicating cases brought against their citizens and
residents. Indeed, for civil law countries and the European Union, defendant
domicile is the presumptive basis for exercising adjudicative authority.214
Third, a strong local defendant presumption is in keeping with Daimler’s
promise of one clear and certain forum “in which a corporate defendant may
be sued on any and all claims.”215
The Ninth Circuit’s approach to the private interest factors provides a
possible model for consolidating these developments. For twenty years now,
courts in the Ninth Circuit have started the private interest analysis with two
unique factors: “the residence of the parties and the witnesses” and “the
forum’s convenience to the litigants.”216 Although they continue through Gulf
Oil’s other private interest factors, they need not. These two factors
211

212

213
214
215
216

See Shi, 918 F.3d at 950 (“[T]he Trusts were sued in their home jurisdiction, which weighs heavily
against dismissal.”); Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1400 (“The defendant’s home forum always has a
strong interest in providing a forum for redress of injuries caused by its citizens.”); Peregrine Myan.
Ltd. v. Sega, 89 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying heightened presumption in favor of retaining
jurisdiction “if the defendant resides in the chosen forum”); Lony v. E.U. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 886 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1989) (giving “considerable weight” to the plaintiff’s choice of forum
when the defendant was being sued in its “home forum where [its] corporate headquarters . . . and
research laboratories” were located); Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 732 (4th Cir. 2010) (“While
we do not suggest that [Defendant’s] place of residence is dispositive, the district court should have
examined this fact more closely in its forum non conveniens analysis . . . .”); Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1229
(“Concerns about forum shopping, while appropriately considered in the forum non conveniens
analysis, are muted in a case such as this where Plaintiffs’ chosen forum is both the defendant’s
home jurisdiction, and a forum with a strong connection to the subject matter of the case.”); cf. Otto
Candies, 963 F.3d at 1343 (“When an American plaintiff sues an American defendant for conduct
allegedly occurring in the United States, it should not be easy for the defendant to obtain a forum
non conveniens dismissal.”).
See Piper, 454 U.S. at 508 (“It is often said [about forum non conveniens] that the plaintiff may not,
by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon
him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.”).
See supra subsection I.A.1.
See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 16, at 91 (describing the civil law’s jurisdictional system as a “plaintiff
follows the defendant’s forum” schema).
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
The revised list first appeared in Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). Its
use has not been entirely consistent, see, e.g., Loya v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.,
583 F.3d 656, 664 (9th Cir. 2009), but it was the list used in Cooper. See Cooper III, 860 F.3d 1193,
1211 (9th Cir. 2017).
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adequately address concerns for fairness and nexus in a manner that allows
for a comparison of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests.
That leaves Gulf Oil’s final private interest consideration: that “[t]here may
also be questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained.”217
Because that phrasing is vague, courts have not always known what to make
of this factor and have, perhaps consequently, often omitted it.218 Judgment
enforceability was not addressed, for example, in either Cooper or Imamura.219
There are two situations, however, in which the enforceability of the
resulting judgment is relevant. First, the U.S. court should retain jurisdiction
if the plaintiff is seeking to recover specific property located in the United
States or if the plaintiff is otherwise seeking non-monetary relief that is only
within the power of a U.S. court to order.220 Second and more commonly, if
the plaintiff is hoping to recover against defendant’s assets that are located in
the United States,221 the defendant should have to demonstrate that a
judgment from the alternative forum will likely be enforceable by a U.S.
court—in other words, that the proceeding in the alternative forum will be
adequately fair and will not conflict with U.S. public policy.222
Ultimately, however, the private interest factors may be of fading
importance. As judges account for changes in modern discovery practice and
recognize that other forums will face equal difficulties in managing crossborder cases, they may increasingly find that the private interest factors do
not point clearly in either direction.
217
218

219
220

221

222

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1496 & n.272 (2011) (noting that only nineteen
percent of U.S. district courts in a random sample of forum non conveniens decisions accounted
for the enforceability of the foreign judgment).
Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D. Mass. 2019) (omitting judgment enforcement from the list of
private interest factors); Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (same).
The Supreme Court has recognized that similar doubts as to whether a plaintiff can obtain the requested
relief from a state court may weigh against surrendering federal jurisdiction in favor of parallel state
litigation. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1983).
See, e.g., Shi v. New Mighty U.S. Trust, 918 F.3d 944, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (emphasizing the
importance of the judgment enforceability factor when the trust funds to which the plaintiff sought
access were located in the United States).
See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 218, at 1494–98 (describing the due process and public policy
grounds on which a U.S. court may decline to enforce a foreign judgment). As Professors Whytock
and Robertson acknowledge, it may be impossible to tell in advance which U.S. state’s law will
apply to the question of judgment recognition and enforcement, but as those laws do not vary
significantly, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act (or the Restatement (Fourth) of
the Foreign Relation Law of the United States) provides an adequate baseline. See id. at 1498 (noting that
state practice with respect to enforcing foreign judgments is “largely uniform”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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3. Clarifying the Public Interest Factors
That may in turn increase the importance of the public interest factors in
the forum non conveniens analysis. These factors, however, are not ready for
prime time. The specific considerations identified in Gulf Oil are both oddly
narrow and ambiguous about what or whose interests, exactly, they are
aiming to protect. Part of the problem is that all of the factors, as phrased in
Gulf Oil, are variations on a single theme: a case that is localized elsewhere
and has no real nexus to the invoked forum.223
Efforts to analyze Gulf Oil’s public interest factors as distinct
considerations have led courts away from that original understanding, but
without adding much value. The first factor—that “administrative difficulties
follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of
being handled at its origin”—is often shortened to a consideration of the
court’s own docket congestion or costs.224 Judges in turn may feel awkward
about asserting their own administrative convenience in telling other
countries to take on difficult cases.225 Indeed, the factor was never intended
to do so; it instead reflects Gulf Oil’s concern for the division of labor within
the federal court system, a problem that Congress solved with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404. This factor should be dropped.
Gulf Oil’s second concern—that “[j]ury duty is a burden that ought not
to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to
the litigation”—is largely moot today. Setting aside how rarely federal civil
juries are in fact empaneled, current personal jurisdiction doctrine will
almost always require a substantial connection between the forum and the

223

224

225

Gulf Oil described relevant public interest considerations as follows:
[i] Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested
centers instead of being handled at its origin. [ii] Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be
imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. [iii] In
cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their
view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by
report only. [iv] There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.
[v] There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is
at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some
other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).
See, e.g., Imamura I, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 11, 14–15 (listing the factor of “administrative difficulties of
docket congestion” and evaluating it only in terms of the U.S. court); Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d at
1131 (listing the factors of “congestion in the courts” and “costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to
this forum”).
See, e.g., Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. at 1136 (finding the factors related to court congestion and costs to
be “neutral” because of the equal burden on Japanese courts).
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dispute, either through the domicile of the defendant or because the alleged
harm otherwise arises out of or relates to the defendant’s in-forum
contacts.226 This concern should be reconfigured as a check to ensure that
the case has some nexus to the United States in circumstances where
personal jurisdiction remains broad, for example, when the court is
exercising admiralty or tag jurisdiction.
The third factor—”[i]n cases that touch the affairs of many persons, there
is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote
parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only”—is repetitive
of the fourth factor and perhaps for that reason is rarely noted.227 Meanwhile,
courts have simplified the fourth factor—that “[t]here is a local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home”—into just an inquiry into
“local interest.” Stripped of the connection to “localized controversies,” an
inquiry into “local interests” can go in many different directions. The Ninth
Circuit has interpreted that abbreviated inquiry as asking only whether the
present forum has a local interest in the dispute.228 The Sixth Circuit, in
contrast, has emphasized whether the wrong occurred in the alternative
forum, explaining that “[t]he country where a product is sold, used, and
regulated has a strong interest, often an insurmountably strong interest, in
litigation involving that product.”229 That reasoning, however, conflates
regulatory interests with adjudicatory interests: the country “where a product
is sold, used, and regulated” may have an interest in seeing its law applied to
the dispute, but not necessarily in being the one to do the applying.230 Indeed,
the Sixth Circuit’s approach overlooks that many countries consider the
defendant’s home forum to be the presumptively appropriate one.231
226
227
228

229
230

231

See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 29, at 432–34 (describing recent developments in personal jurisdiction
doctrine).
See, e.g., Shi, 918 F.3d at 952 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Gulf Oil for the public interest factors but
omitting reference to “cases which touch the affairs of many persons”).
See Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1232–33 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2011)
(describing the local interest factor as “determining if the forum in which the lawsuit was filed has
its own identifiable interest in the litigation which can justify proceeding”); Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]ith this interest factor, we ask only if there
is an identifiable local interest in the controversy, not whether another forum also has an interest.”);
see also Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1233 n.3 (acknowledging the “difference of opinion [across federal
circuits] about whether it is appropriate to compare the state interests, or whether this factor is
solely concerned with the forum where the lawsuit was filed”).
See, e.g., Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 500 (6th Cir. 2016).
Such regulatory interests are accounted for through choice-of-law analysis, with federal courts
applying state choice of law rules in diversity cases. In fact, the Sixth Circuit’s emphasis on the
forum where the harm occurred could be seen as a backdoor imposition of lex loci delicti on U.S.
states that have abandoned the strict formalism of the Restatement (First) of Conflicts of Laws.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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What is missing from both the Ninth and Sixth Circuits’ approaches is
Gulf Oil’s emphasis on localized controversies—disputes in which the
alternative forum has the primary nexus. A lot of transnational cases are not
localized in any jurisdiction; the parties may have many nationalities, the
relevant conduct might spread across multiple jurisdictions, or the harm
might be dispersed. The third and fourth factor, as articulated by Gulf Oil, do
not have much to say about such cases. They are more helpful in cases that
do involve localized controversies, in which circumstance they give weight to
the adjudicatory interest of the forum where the controversy arose.
The Fukushima cases provide an example of such a localized dispute.
While there were U.S. parties in both Imamura and Cooper, the underlying
incident occurred in Japan, primarily harmed Japanese citizens, and was a
matter of national importance that “touch[ed] the affairs of many persons.”232
Further, Japan had established a comprehensive remedial scheme to handle
claims arising out of this incident, and it had an adjudicatory interest in
ensuring that such efforts were not undermined by piecemeal litigation in other
forums.233
Such comprehensive remedial schemes could be treated as a particular
type of localized controversy that weighs in favor of deference to the foreign
court system. Indeed, the Fukushima cases were not the first time that
federal courts have struggled to account for foreign comprehensive remedial
schemes and the need to guard against spoilers. In Ungaro-Benages, for
example, the Eleventh Circuit redefined international comity abstention to
account for Germany’s “significant interest in having the Foundation [it
created] be the exclusive forum for [Holocaust] claims in its efforts to achieve
lasting legal peace,” efforts that would “affect thousands of other victims of
the Nazi regime.”234 The Second Circuit in Bi v. Union Carbide Chemicals &
Plastics Co. Inc.235 dismissed a challenge brought by survivors of the Bhopal
gas disaster in opposition to the settlement negotiated by the Indian
232
233

234
235

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
In the domestic context, the very rough analogy would be to Burford abstention, which allows federal
courts to decline their jurisdiction when determination of a state-law issue would “disrupt the State’s
attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an ‘essentially local problem.’” New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989) (quoting Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951)). As Professor Burbank would be the first
to point out, we should be wary of transplanting domestic doctrines of federalism to the
international sphere. The connection is drawn simply to underscore the validity of a sovereign’s
adjudicatory interest in protecting interdependent remedial systems.
Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2004).
984 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1993). The appellate court was not entirely clear, however, as to the doctrinal basis
for that dismissal, though it framed the discussion in terms of the plaintiffs’ lack of standing.

2266

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

government because the court was worried the challenge would “frustrate
India’s efforts” to negotiate on behalf of all victims.236 In Pravin Banker
Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru,237 the Second Circuit acknowledged
concerns about allowing a creditor holdout to jeopardize Peru’s efforts to
restructure its sovereign debt, though it ultimately allowed the suit to
proceed.238 And in Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp.,239 the Ninth Circuit used forum
non conveniens to defer to New Zealand’s national compensation scheme
that “provides coverage, on a no-fault basis, for those who suffer personal
injury arising from accidents,”240 a system that only works because New
Zealand has barred civil tort claims for such damages.
This interest in not enabling spoilers has already been addressed in the
context of cross-border insolvencies, to which we will turn shortly.241 But
though the problem arises often in the bankruptcy context, it can arise in
other contexts as well. Making space for it within forum non conveniens
would allow courts to acknowledge and give weight to the concern within a
doctrinal context that can help evaluate the fairness and reliability of the
foreign remedial scheme. Under the reformed private interests factors, for
example, plaintiffs can argue that the foreign sovereign’s claim processing
scheme is insufficient because it reflects capture by powerful defendants, or
because it will drag on for decades, or because it lacks the funds to adequately
compensate victims.242 Meanwhile, other public interest factors—like the
applicability of U.S. law or non-localization of the dispute in the foreign
forum—can help flag when deference to a foreign comprehensive remedial
scheme may not be appropriate.
That leaves the fifth factor from Gulf Oil: that “[t]here is an
appropriateness . . . in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at
home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court
in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign
to itself.”243 Some federal judges are quick to point out that it is their job to

236
237
238
239
240
241
242

243

Id. at 586.
109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
See id. at 852–55. The procedural vehicle used in that case was most akin to the bankruptcy
abstention cases discussed below in Section II.C. See id. (citing bankruptcy cases).
36 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1141.
See infra Section II.C.
Cf. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (discounting Hungary’s
interest in resolving the asserted Holocaust restitution claims given that it “had over seventy years
to vindicate its interests in addressing its role in the Holocaust”).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
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apply foreign law,244 just as it is their job to apply “uncertain or difficult to
determine” state law.245 Yet other federal courts have interpreted this factor
as strongly favoring dismissal whenever foreign law will apply.246 It is not the
difficulty of applying foreign law, however, that should favor dismissal. Rather,
choice of law is relevant because, all else being equal, sovereigns have an
interest in applying their own law—especially for common law jurisdictions
in which the process of application shapes the contours of the law.
Recognizing this interest, the Tenth Circuit has elevated the choice-of-law
question to a threshold inquiry: if the court determines that U.S. law will
apply to the dispute, it should exercise its jurisdiction.247 At the very least,
given the starting presumption in favor of exercising jurisdiction, the
applicability of U.S. law should weigh strongly against dismissal.248
Conversely, in light of the same starting presumption, the applicability of the
alternative forum’s law would weigh in favor of declining jurisdiction, but
something more—like the localization of the dispute in the alternative forum
or the lack of a meaningful U.S. nexus—would still be needed.249
* * *
In sum, an updated forum non conveniens doctrine would start with a
strong presumption in favor of retaining jurisdiction. Once an alternative
forum that could hear the dispute has been identified, the court should
consider the habitual residence of the parties, assess both parties’
particularized litigation concerns either here or abroad, and determine
whether a U.S. forum is necessary for the plaintiff to secure an enforceable
judgment. The local domicile of the defendant or the applicability of U.S.
law should weigh strongly against dismissal; a lack of meaningful nexus to the

244
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246

247
248
249

See, e.g., DiFederico v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 807–08 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that
interpreting foreign law “is precisely the kind of work American judges perform on a daily basis”).
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234–37 (1943) (emphasizing that federal courts should
not decline to exercise their diversity jurisdiction due to the difficulty of a question of state law); see
also Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) (warning that in diversity cases,
“the parties may not be remitted to a state court merely because of the difficulty of making a decision
in the federal court”).
See, e.g., Jiali Tang v. Syntura Int’l, Inc., 656 F.3d 242, 252 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he district court
would likely encounter complex issues of Chinese law. The forum non conveniens doctrine exists
largely to avoid such comparative law problems.”).
See, e.g., Rivendell Forest Prods. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[F]orum
non conveniens is not applicable if American law controls.”).
Cf. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 245 n.197 (noting particular appropriateness
of a presumption against dismissal for cases arising under federal regulatory statutes).
See, e.g., Shi v. New Mighty U.S. Trust, 918 F.3d 944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (stressing that the
applicability of foreign law is not dispositive for forum non conveniens); Reid-Walen v. Hansen,
933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1991) (similar).
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United States or the “localization” of the dispute in the alternative forum
would point in favor of dismissal. The court might also give weight to the
alternative forum’s effort to resolve interconnected claims in a
comprehensive manner.
Note that even this reformed rubric would not have generated an obvious
answer in the Fukushima cases. But it might have helped distill more clearly
the competing adjudicatory interests in both cases: on the one side, the U.S.
interest in adjudicating disputes involving U.S. citizens and residents, and on
the other side, the applicability of Japanese law, the localized nature of the
disaster, and the interdependent features of Japan’s compensation scheme,
all of which indicated Japan’s significant adjudicatory interests in the
disputes.
B. Foreign Parallel Proceedings
Commentators have long complained that the federal courts need a clear
doctrine for addressing parallel proceedings in foreign forums. Some courts
have used forum non conveniens for this purpose.250 But forum non
conveniens is not an appropriate framework as it may overweight the
plaintiff’s choice of forum and underweight other considerations that are
particularly relevant in the context of parallel proceedings, like the degree of
similarity between the two lawsuits or the degree of progress in the foreign
forum.251 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has provided clear guidance in
terms of parallel proceedings in domestic courts. In Landis v. North American
Co., the Court held that federal courts have inherent authority to defer to
parallel proceedings in other federal courts252 and suggested that they should
generally do so in order to avoid the wastefulness of duplicative litigation.253
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, the Court affirmed
that federal courts have the inherent authority to defer to parallel proceedings
in state courts as well, but it warned that federal courts should only defer to
state courts in exceptional circumstances given the federal courts’ “virtually
unflagging obligation” to exercise the diversity jurisdiction that Congress has
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See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 37, at 532 n.3 (6th ed. 2018) (gathering cases); N. Jansen
Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 601, 671–72 (2006) (gathering cases but critiquing their analysis).

251

Cf. Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 54 (1st Cir. 2007) (stressing the difference in
defendant’s burden between the two inquiries).

252

299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936).
See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (“[T]he
general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation [across federal courts.]”).
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assigned them.254 The Court has provided no guidance, however, on when
federal courts should defer to parallel proceedings in other countries.
1. Current Approaches
In the gap, the lower federal courts have developed three approaches to
foreign parallel proceedings. First, a number of circuits have applied Colorado
River directly to transnational cases. The Seventh Circuit was an early and
clear leader in this regard,255 and the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit have
followed suit.256
Second, district courts in circuits without controlling precedent have
developed an approach that is also based on an analogy to federal-state
parallel litigation but has a provenance distinct from the Colorado River
framework. The Southern District of New York initially developed this
approach in cases like Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace257 and Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss
Credit Bank.258 In doing so, it drew on a test that pre-dated Colorado River but
was similarly designed to evaluate federal-state parallel litigation;259 over
time, however, the Southern District modified that test slightly to account for

254
255

256

257
258
259

See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15, 19 (1983) (citing
Colorado River’s “exceptional circumstances” test).
See Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying the
Colorado River framework to a parallel proceeding in Belgian courts); see also AAR Int’l, Inc. v.
Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2001) (same with a parallel Greek proceeding);
Finova Cap. Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 898–99 (7th Cir. 1999) (same
with a parallel proceeding in St. Lucia).
Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2009)
(applying the Colorado River test); Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (same);
Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
fact that the parallel proceedings are pending in a foreign jurisdiction rather than in a state court is
immaterial. We reject the notion that a federal court owes greater deference to foreign courts than to our
own state courts.”). Note that there may be some variation across the circuits to the extent that the circuits’
application of Colorado River differs. But the general contours of the framework are the same.
649 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
543 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
See Cont’l Time Corp., 543 F. Supp. at 410 (citing I.J.A., Inc. v. Marine Holdings, Ltd., Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 197, 198 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (citing Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(developing a test for when federal courts should defer to parallel proceedings in state courts))); see
also, e.g., Ronar, 649 F. Supp. at 318 (citing Continental Time and I.J.A.); Caspian Invs., Ltd., v. Vicom
Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Ronar and Continental Time). The
reasoning of Nigro foreshadowed that of Colorado River: It recognized that parallel litigation in federal
and state courts is generally tolerated and that the federal courts typically have a duty to exercise
the jurisdiction they have been given. Nigro, 373 F. Supp. at 1209. But like Colorado River, Nigro also
recognized that the federal courts have discretion to stay or dismiss suits in some circumstances, id.
at 1209 & n.6, and it identified factors for exercising that discretion that overlap significantly with
those of Colorado River. Id. at 1212–13.
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the international context of foreign parallel proceedings.260 The Southern
District’s framework proved influential: it has been adopted verbatim by
leading district court opinions in the Eighth,261 First,262 and Tenth Circuits,263
and it informed the development of the third approach to foreign parallel
proceedings—that of “international comity abstention.”
The Eleventh Circuit developed the concept of international comity
abstention in Turner as a combination of the Colorado River and district court
approaches to foreign parallel proceedings; it also mixed in factors related to
the enforcement of foreign judgments.264 Subsequently, the Second Circuit
in Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Co. v. Century International265 mixed the
Southern District of New York’s approach with some of Turner’s
considerations and adopted Turner’s label of “international comity
abstention.”266
2. A Consolidated Approach
These three approaches—that of Colorado River, the district court
framework, and international comity abstention—are more alike than
they are different. The factors they consider overlap significantly.267

260

261

262
263
264

265
266
267

See, e.g., Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int’l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 103 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“While Colorado River and its progeny may be instructive in the present context, the considerations
involved in deferring to state court proceedings are different from those involved in deferring to
foreign proceedings, where concerns of international comity arise and issues of federalism and
federal supremacy are not in play.”).
See, e.g., Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v. McDonnell Douglas Foreign Sales Corp.,
988 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (citing Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 410 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1993) (citing Caspian Investments)).
See, e.g., Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252–53 (D. Mass. 1999) (citing
Evergreen Marine, Caspian Investments, Continental Time, Boushel, and Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons).
See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (D. Colo.
2000) (citing Evergreen, Boushel, and Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons).
Turner Ent. Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994). The Turner court’s
incorporation of judgment enforcement factors reflected the unusual posture of that case, which
involved a parallel foreign proceeding that had already resulted in a judgment. Id. at 1517. It may
also have reflected the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), for its
definition of international comity. See id. at 1519 (quoting Hilton). While Hilton provides the Supreme
Court’s most emphatic and well-known invocation of international comity, it defined international
comity in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Courts should be
careful not to conflate Hilton’s discussion of judgment enforcement factors with the concept of
international comity more broadly.
466 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2006).
See id. at 92–94 (citing Turner’s three principles of “the proper respect for litigation in and the courts
of a sovereign nation, fairness to litigants, and judicial efficiency.”).
The Colorado River approach requires first a determination that the suits are in fact parallel and then
balances such factors as “the relative inconvenience of the federal forum, the relative order of the
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Notably, they also all start from an analogy to the treatment of federal-state
parallel litigation.268
The lower courts are correct that foreign parallel proceedings are more
akin to federal-state parallel proceedings than they are to federal-federal
parallel proceedings. When a federal court defers under Landis to parallel
litigation in another federal court, the federal courts as a whole are still
exercising the jurisdiction granted by Congress. In contrast, the federal
courts abdicate that jurisdiction when they defer to parallel proceedings in
the courts of another sovereign, whether that of a U.S. state or that of a

268

two suits, the source of law in the case, and the relative progress of the two proceedings.” Al-Abood
ex rel. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2000). The district court approaches
considers the “(1) similarity of parties and issues . . . ; (2) the promotion of judicial efficiency; (3)
adequacy of relief available in the alternative forum; (4) issues of fairness to and convenience of the
parties, counsel, and witnesses; (5) the possibility of prejudice to any of the parties; and (6) the
temporal sequence of the filing of the actions.” Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp.
2d 248, 252–53 (D. Mass. 1999). The Second Circuit’s version of international comity abstention
weighs “the similarity of the parties, the similarity of the issues, the order in which the actions were
filed, the adequacy of the alternate forum, the potential prejudice to either party, the convenience
of the parties, the connection between the litigation and the United States, and the connection
between the litigation and the foreign jurisdiction.” Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century
Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2006).
A few district court cases have instead analogized to federal-federal parallel litigation under Landis.
The most notable example is Brinco Mining Ltd. v. Federal Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233, 1240
(D.D.C. 1982) (“This Court is of the view that the standard should be the same as that between two
federal courts” for reasons particular to that case, namely that the plaintiff had already instituted
proceedings in its home country of Canada, “a country that shares the same common law roots as
our jurisprudence”); see also St. Clair Intell. Prop. Consultants v. Fujifilm Holdings Corp., No. 08373-JJF-LPS, 2009 WL 192457 at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 27, 2009) (invoking Landis). But these outliers
have been overtaken by the three dominant approaches. More recent decisions from the District of
D.C., for example, have followed the Second Circuit’s international comity abstention approach.
See Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 78 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting
Royal & Sun, 466 F.3d at 94); LG Display Co. Ltd. v. Obayashi Seikou Co., Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 2d
17, 24 (D.D.C. 2013) (same).
Similarly, some earlier Southern District of New York cases cited Brinco when giving priority to the
first-filed case. See Caspian Invs., Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (citing Brinco); Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“When . . .
the foreign action is pending rather than decided, comity counsels that priority generally goes to
the suit first filed.”). But more recent cases using the Southern District’s framework have uniformly
started from a presumption in favor of retaining jurisdiction, regardless of which suit was filed first.
See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1246 (invoking Colorado River’s exceptional
circumstances standard); Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int’l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Federal courts are reluctant to decline jurisdiction solely on the basis of concurrent
proceedings in another jurisdiction.”). To the extent commentators have identified a fourth approach
to foreign parallel proceedings based on Landis, those categorizations thus appear to be outdated. See,
e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 37, at 535-35, 541 (distinguishing between Colorado River and Landis
approaches to foreign parallel proceedings); Jocelyn H. Bush, To Abstain or Not To Abstain: A New
Framework for Application of the Abstention Doctrine in International Parallel Proceedings, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 127,
141 & n.84 (2008) (similar); Calamita, supra note 250, at 666 & n.201 (similar).
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foreign nation. If anything, the separation-of-powers concern will be greater
when a federal court declines its jurisdiction in favor of a foreign court than
when it declines its jurisdiction in favor of a state court, given that the state
courts operate within the same common law context as the federal courts and
are bound by the same constitutional and federal statutory constraints.
Nonetheless, some minor differences remain across the three lower
court approaches. Those differences can be grouped into three questions:
first, what should the doctrine be called? Second, how strong should the
starting presumption be? And third, what specific considerations should
judges take into account?
The first question is actually quite important. The lower federal courts,
in particular the Second and Eleventh Circuits, should stop calling deference
to foreign parallel proceedings “international comity abstention.” The
vagueness and breadth of that label has invited conflation between what
should be distinct lines of precedent.269 Referring simply to Colorado River is
also a bit misleading, as deference to foreign parallel proceedings raises
different questions and concerns than deference to state parallel
proceedings.270 Scholars tend to prefer the label lis alibi pendens, or “litigation
pending elsewhere.” But the federal courts have so far not embraced the
terminology in relation to foreign parallel proceedings.271 Further, the term’s
connection to the European approach to parallel proceedings could prove a
new source of confusion, at least to the extent that the U.S. practice continues
to differ from the European practice in significant respects.272
The key difference between the European approach and the current U.S.
approach is the starting presumption: while Europe follows a fairly strict rule
of deferring to the first-filed case akin to the Landis approach for federalfederal parallel litigation, the consensus in the federal courts is that
duplicative litigation across sovereigns is generally tolerated.273 If the federal
courts were to adopt something closer to a first-filed approach in order to
align more closely with the practice and expectations of European allies, then

269
270

271
272
273

For further description of such conflation, see subsection I.B.1 above and Section II.D below.
See, e.g., Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 213 (commenting that equating
interstate and international instances of parallel proceedings is “indefensible”); Calamita, supra note
250, at 655 (criticizing the use of domestic doctrines for parallel proceedings in the international
context).
For a rare exception, see Seguros del Estado, S.A. v. Sci. Games, Inc., 262 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir.
2001) (referring to lis alibi pendens in the context of foreign parallel proceedings).
For a description of the European approach to parallel proceedings in foreign courts, see for
example Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 215–19.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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referencing lis alibi pendens could helpfully distinguish between that approach
and the more restrictive Colorado River approach to federal-state parallel
litigation. Given separation-of-powers concerns, however, the adoption of a
first-filed presumption should ideally be implemented by Congress, and
preferably in the context of a multilateral agreement that would help ensure
reciprocal treatment by foreign courts.274 For now, it is best to refer
explicitly to the problem of foreign parallel proceedings, at least until a
consolidated and rationalized approach comes to be associated with a
specific precedent.
But just because the federal courts are wary of a European-style first-filed
approach does not mean they must apply the exact same standard as Colorado
River. Indeed, although the three dominant approaches all analogize to
federal-state parallel litigation, the strength of their starting presumptions
differ slightly. At one end of the spectrum, Turner appears to apply no
presumption either in favor of keeping jurisdiction or in favor of deferring to
parallel litigation; its analysis moves straight into balancing.275 At the other
end of the spectrum, the Second Circuit has interpreted Colorado River’s
reference to exceptional circumstances as requiring “additional
circumstances” beyond those “that routinely exist in connection with parallel
litigation” in foreign courts.276
The better approach is to start with a Colorado River-like presumption in
favor of retaining jurisdiction but to recognize, as some of the district courts
have done, that “the considerations involved in deferring to state court
proceedings are different from those involved in deferring to foreign
proceedings, where concerns of international comity arise and issues of
federalism and federal supremacy are not in play.”277 When foreign litigation
is truly duplicative and the case is significantly advanced in the foreign forum,
that may be sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant deference. At the same
time, federal courts might be more sensitive to parties’ access-to-justice
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See Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 215 (“[I]n the absence of the unifying
influences of a treaty, [the ‘federal-federal model’] is not obviously more appropriate for
international cases”); id. at 229–34 (“It is time to implement . . . legislation that provides federal lis
pendens standards, binding in state and federal courts alike.”).
See Turner Ent. Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994) (not discussing
any starting presumption).
Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2006); see also id. at
93 (insisting on, for the purposes of exceptional circumstances, “considerations which are
not generally present as a result of parallel litigation”).
E.g., EFCO Corp. v. Aluma Sys., USA, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 816, 824 n.5 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (quoting
Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int’l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 103 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
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concerns should federal jurisdiction be declined than they would be in the
context of federal-state parallel litigation.
Turning to the factors to be considered, though there is substantial
overlap between the three approaches, there are also some differences. The
goal here is to map a consolidated set of factors that reflects the best of each
of the existing approaches while better accounting for the international
context. Identifying the relevant factors requires some agreement on what
the purpose of the doctrine is. In this regard, Turner correctly enumerated
“three readily identifiable goals” in navigating “concurrent international
jurisdiction”: “(1) . . . international comity; (2) fairness to litigants; and (3)
efficient use of scarce judicial resources.”278 These goals are not themselves
factors; rather, they inform what the relevant factors should be.279
For example, a stay or dismissal of a U.S. action will only further comity,
protect fairness, and achieve efficiency if the foreign proceedings are actually
parallel, meaning that the parties and the issues are the same.280 Not
surprisingly, then, all three current approaches agree that there should be
substantial similarity between the parties and the issues, though only the
Colorado River approach makes substantial similarity a threshold
requirement.281 The Colorado River approach is correct in this regard. Given
the centrality of similarity to all three of the doctrine’s underlying goals, it
should be treated as a necessary condition. Further, substantial similarity is
what sets this doctrine apart from other doctrines of transnational abstention.
Tools like forum non conveniens and deference to foreign bankruptcy
proceedings can address situations in which there is meaningful overlap
between cases but no potential for the judgment in one case to foreclose
relitigation in the other.
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See Turner, 25 F.3d at 1518; see also, e.g., Royal & Sun, 466 F.3d at 94 (“In the context of parallel
proceedings in a foreign court, a district court should be guided by the principles upon which
international comity is based: the proper respect for litigation in and the courts of a sovereign
nation, fairness to litigants, and judicial efficiency.”).
Thus courts might consider dropping from their balancing tests such factors as “the promotion of
judicial efficiency” or “issues of fairness,” e.g., Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp.
2d 248, 252–53 (D. Mass. 1999), which restate the question that needs to be answered.
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 37, at 545 (gathering cases analyzing similarity in light of such
concerns).
Compare Al-Abood ex rel. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (describing
similarity as a threshold question under the Colorado River framework), with Royal & Sun, 466 F.3d at
94 (“[P]roper consideration . . . will no doubt require an evaluation of various factors, such as the
similarity of the parties, [and] the similarity of the issues . . . .”).
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All three goals—comity, fairness, and efficiency—also depend on there
being “a recognizable judgment . . . in prospect.”282 In the context of federalstate parallel litigation, federal courts can presume that state court litigation
will result in a recognizable judgment. The state courts are applying the same
constitutional limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction and the same
constitutional requirements of due process as would the federal courts.
Further, federal courts must give full faith and credit to state court
judgments,283 and the law of preclusion is roughly the same, even if not
identical, across U.S. jurisdictions. Those preconditions do not exist in the
context of foreign parallel proceedings.
Ensuring that a recognizable judgment is in prospect means “inquiring
whether the basis of jurisdiction in the foreign court me[ets] minimum
standards and, ex ante, that there [i]s no systemic or insuperable situational
barrier to the fair conduct of proceedings abroad and no likelihood of a
judgment manifestly incompatible with American public policy.”284 Foreign
judgments are not recognizable in U.S. courts if the foreign court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the parties, for example, or if its “judicial system . . .
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law.”285 Nonetheless, this threshold question
can be a minimal check rather than a rigorous inquiry. U.S. courts are
generally willing to recognize foreign judgments; further, because the present
court cannot be certain how a later court will assess the yet-to-be-rendered
foreign judgment, any prospective problems would have to be fairly obvious.
None of the current approaches to foreign parallel proceedings treat the
potential validity of the foreign judgment as a threshold issue. Within the
broader set of factors, however, the Second Circuit does consider the
“adequacy of the alternate forum,”286 while the Eleventh Circuit considers
the competence of the foreign court and its general use of “fair and just
proceedings.”287 Factors like these could be clarified to address, at the outset,
whether the foreign court is capable of rendering a judgment that could be
recognized by a U.S. court.
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284
285
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287

Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 234 (noting that this check ensures “that the
expense and delay of parallel litigation can be avoided, and that it would be fair to do so”).
28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 234.
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1) (NAT’L CONF.
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2005).
E.g., Royal & Sun, 466 F.3d at 94.
Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1224 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Turner Ent. Co. v. Degeto
Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994) (similar).
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Another factor that furthers all three goals is whether the foreign suit was
filed first and how far it has progressed. All of the current approaches already
consider the order in which the cases are filed.288 This has the benefit of being
an easily ascertainable fact, but by itself it will likely not be enough to
overcome the starting presumption of tolerating duplicative litigation.
Weightier is evidence of significant progress in the foreign proceedings, a
factor that the Colorado River courts in particular have emphasized.289 The
further advanced the foreign proceeding, the greater the comity, fairness,
and efficiency gains in deferring to it.
Most of the remaining factors considered by each of the three current
approaches relate to the connection between the forums and the dispute,290
the source of law to be applied,291 and the convenience of the parties, which
typically means the location of evidence and witnesses.292 These factors are
all variations on the question of nexus: does one forum have a significantly
greater connection to the dispute than the other? Speaking in terms of nexus
or connection may be more helpful than referring to party convenience,
which risks devolving into the private interest factor analysis of forum non
conveniens.293 The relevant question in the context of foreign parallel
288
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290
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292
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See, e.g., Royal & Sun, 466 F.3d at 94 (considering “the order in which the actions were filed”); Finova
Cap. Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (D. Colo. 2000) (considering
“the temporal sequence of the filing of the actions”).
See, e.g., Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 458, 467 (6th Cir.
2009) (“Additional factors include how far the parallel proceeding has advanced . . . .”); Al-Abood ex
rel. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting “the relative progress of the
two proceedings”); Finova, 180 F.3d at 898 (considering “the relative progress of the federal and
foreign proceedings”). Accord, e.g., Turner Ent. Co., 25 F.3d at 1522 (considering “the alternative
forum is likely to render a prompt disposition”); Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v.
McDonnell Douglas Foreign Sales Corp., 988 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (considering
“the degree of process already made in the [foreign] action”).
See, e.g., Royal & Sun, 466 F.3d at 94 (considering “the connection between the litigation and the
United States, and the connection between the litigation and the foreign jurisdiction”); Turner
Ent., 25 F.3d at 1521 (considering “the relative strengths of the American and German interests”
in the litigation).
See, e.g., Al-Abood, 217 F.3d at 232 (considering “the source of the law in the case”); Finova, 180 F.3d
at 898 (considering “whether federal or foreign law provides the rule of decision”).
See, e.g., Answers in Genesis, 556 F.3d at 467, 469 (considering “the convenience of the parties,” which
the court assessed in terms of the location of witnesses); Royal & Sun, 466 F.3d at 94 (same); IBC
Advanced Techs., Inc. v. Ucore Rare Metals Inc., 415 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1032–33 (D. Utah 2019)
(analyzing “issues of fairness to and convenience of the parties, counsel, and witnesses” in terms of
the location of evidence and witnesses (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins., 115 F. Supp. at 1247)).
Cf. Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int’l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 105 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(noting that much of the defendant’s arguments were “couched in forum non conveniens terms”
but emphasizing the distinction between that doctrine and deference to foreign parallel
proceedings).
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proceedings is not convenience, but whether the connection between the
dispute and the foreign forum is so much more significant that it merits
overriding the default presumption in favor of duplicative litigation.
Finally, both the district court approach and the international comity
abstention approach separately consider “the possibility of prejudice to any
of the parties.”294 That factor could serve as a backstop to allow courts to
consider more unusual circumstances that may weigh against abstention.
Care should be taken, however, to avoid repeating considerations already
accounted for through the prior factors, all of which also relate to party
fairness. One such unusual circumstance might be the potential inadequacy
of relief available in the alternative forum;295 a party might be meaningfully
prejudiced by the granting or denial of a stay if either the U.S. court or the
foreign court is uniquely able to provide the relief sought, for example
because the plaintiff is seeking an injunction pertaining to parties or property
located within one of the forums.
* * *
In sum, a unified and refined approach to foreign parallel litigation would
start with a presumption in favor of retaining jurisdiction, but one that can
be overcome without one-of-a-kind circumstances. The federal court should
first ensure that the parties and issues are substantially similar and that the
foreign court is capable of rendering a recognizable judgment and providing
the requested relief. In then deciding whether to exercise its discretion to
defer to the foreign proceedings, the U.S. federal court should primarily
consider how far the foreign suit has progressed and whether the foreign
forum has a significantly greater nexus to the dispute.
Finally, courts should effectuate this deference through stays rather than
dismissals. In addition to alleviating (albeit only slightly) the separation-ofpowers concerns, a stay recognizes that “ex ante predictions about
recognition and delay are more difficult in the international context”296 and
reserves the federal judge’s ability to ensure that the parties are not unduly
prejudiced by the court’s exercise of discretion.

294
295
296

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp. at 1247; see also, e.g., Royal & Sun, 466 F.3d at 94 (similar);
Turner Ent., 25 F.3d at 1522 (similar).
The district court approach currently includes such a factor in addition to a factor regarding party
prejudice. E.g., Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253 (D. Mass. 1999).
Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, supra note 16, at 234.
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C. Cross-Border Bankruptcies
Federal courts have developed a separate abstention doctrine to address
deference to foreign bankruptcy proceedings.297 Deference to foreign
adjudication of primary bankruptcy proceedings has a broader sweep than
deference to parallel litigation because it encompasses a concern for merely
overlapping or related claims. As the Second Circuit has put it, “[t]he
equitable and orderly distribution of a debtor’s property requires assembling
all claims against the limited assets in a single proceeding; if all creditors could
not be bound, a plan of reorganization would fail.”298
That difference in underlying rationale leads to differences in the
applicable frameworks. First, the parties and issues need not be substantially
similar; U.S. courts may need to stay or dismiss litigation that is related to
foreign bankruptcy proceedings in order to avoid undermining the work of
foreign courts in administering bankruptcy estates.299 Second, the starting
presumption is that U.S. courts should defer to primary bankruptcy
proceedings in foreign courts, a presumption opposite the one currently used
by any circuit that has addressed foreign parallel proceedings more
generally.300 That strong presumption in favor of deference reflects not only
the pragmatic need to consolidate insolvency proceedings in one jurisdiction,
but also Congress’s direction to cooperate with foreign jurisdictions
regarding cross-border bankruptcies. In its 1978 reform of the bankruptcy
297

298

299

300

The most significant line of such cases comes from the Second Circuit. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase
Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 424 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We have repeatedly
held that U.S. courts should ordinarily decline to adjudicate creditor claims that are the subject of a
foreign bankruptcy proceeding.”); Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economica S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246
(2d Cir. 1999) (“We have repeatedly noted the importance of extending comity to foreign bankruptcy
proceedings.”); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Grp. Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[C]omity
is particularly appropriate where . . . the court is confronted with foreign bankruptcy proceedings.”);
Victrix S.S. Co. S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Under general
principles of comity . . . , federal courts will recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings provided the
foreign laws comport with due process and fairly treat claims of local creditors.”); Cunard S.S. Co.
Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Servs., AB, 773 F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir. 1985) (“We hold that . . . the district court
properly extended comity to the Swedish adjudication of bankruptcy and stay of creditor actions.”); see
also Remington Rand Corp.-Del. v. Bus. Sys., Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d Cir. 1987) (recognizing
the practice of granting comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings).
Victrix, 825 F.2d at 713–14; see also Cunard, 773 F.2d at 458 (“The granting of comity to a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding enables the assets of a debtor to be dispersed in an equitable, orderly, and
systematic manner, rather than in a haphazard, erratic or piecemeal fashion.”).
See, e.g., JP Morgan, 412 F.3d at 427 (“Inasmuch as the bank’s claim is really that of a creditor seeking
payment of a debt, the only issue for us to decide is whether the debt is the subject of a parallel
foreign bankruptcy proceeding[.]”).
See supra Section II.B (describing how lower federal courts treat foreign parallel proceedings similarly
to parallel litigation in state courts).
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code, Congress adopted 11 U.S.C. § 304, which allowed a “foreign
representative” to file a bankruptcy petition in U.S. court that was “ancillary
to a foreign proceeding.”301 Section 304 granted the U.S. court broad
authority to assist the foreign primary proceeding by, inter alia, enjoining
actions in U.S. courts or ordering the turnover of property to the foreign
representative.302 And it directed that, in considering such relief, the U.S.
court “shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious
administration” of the bankruptcy estate, taking into consideration fairness,
public policy, and “comity.”303 This statutory direction, as well as the
cooperative spirit behind it, encouraged the courts to defer to foreign
bankruptcy proceedings or to cooperate directly with them304 while also
relieving the separation-of-powers concerns that accompany abstention.
The need for such a common law abstention doctrine to effectuate
bankruptcy cooperation decreased significantly, however, with the adoption
in 2005 of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which implemented the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency.305 While § 304 had
“provided a structure for cooperation and coordination” in cross-border
bankruptcies, it also left judges with broad discretion as to whether and how
to assist foreign proceedings, and that discretion was not always applied
consistently.306 Section 304 had also been a unilateral effort on the part of
the United States to improve cooperation in bankruptcy matters; in contrast,
the Model Law was a multilateral effort and thus had greater “potential to
harmonize the treatment of cross-border insolvency.”307 Chapter 15, in
replacing § 304 and implementing that Model Law, established a stronger
deference regime for foreign bankruptcy because it “begins with the
instruction to U.S. bankruptcy judges that cooperation and coordination are
the rule and not the exception and then provides a structure within which
judges can operate.”308 Because of this clearer statutory framework, the
federal appellate courts appear no longer to need the judge-made deference
doctrine; instead, since 2005 they have invoked the “doctrine of international
301
302
303
304

305
306
307
308

11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (repealed 2005).
11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (repealed 2005).
See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (repealed 2005).
See, e.g., Gitlin v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp.), 93 F.3d 1036, 1048 (2d Cir.
1996) (“Congress explicitly recognized the importance of the principles of international comity in
transnational insolvency situations when it revised the bankruptcy laws” to add § 304).
Edward S. Adams & Jason K. Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves
Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 43, 46 (2008). Congress repealed § 304 at the same time.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 80.
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comity” in the bankruptcy context not to determine whether to decline their
jurisdiction, but rather to identify the reach of U.S. bankruptcy laws.309 That
is an application of prescriptive comity, not the adjudicative comity of
abstention. Going forward, then, the primary takeaway from this category of
abstention is that courts considering deference to foreign parallel proceedings
should avoid relying on cases addressing cross-border bankruptcies, as those
cases have applied different presumptions and considerations.
D. Inappropriate Bases for Transnational Abstention
The broad label of “international comity abstention” has encouraged
courts to use it beyond the context of forum non conveniens, foreign parallel
proceedings, and cross-border bankruptcies. These experiments are illadvised. There is no requirement of or need for prudential exhaustion in
transnational cases. Abstention is a dangerous tool for analyzing foreign
relations concerns. And it is not the right lens for analyzing issues of
preclusion or statutory interpretation.
1. Rejecting Prudential Exhaustion
Two circuits have invoked the concept of prudential exhaustion to
decline jurisdiction over particular sets of claims: the Seventh Circuit in
regards to Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) cases and the Ninth
Circuit in regards to Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases.310 Requiring prudential
exhaustion for transnational cases is a mistake, though one that has luckily
not spread to other circuits.311 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has cast doubt on

309

310

311

See, e.g., In re Picard, 917 F.3d 85, 103–05 (2d Cir. 2019) (invoking “prescriptive comity” in evaluating
“when and why the Bankruptcy Code should give way to foreign law”); French v. Liebman (In re French),
440 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2006) (considering “whether to forego application of our own [bankruptcy]
law under the doctrine of international comity” in deference to Bahamian bankruptcy law).
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 424
rep. n. 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (citing Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 856–
59 (7th Cir. 2015), and Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 828–32 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(plurality opinion), vacated on other grounds, 569 U.S. 945 (2013)).
See, e.g., Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172, 1180–81 (D.C. Cir. 2018), rev’d on other
grounds, 141 S. Ct. 691 (2021) (rejecting prudential exhaustion for FSIA claims); Jean v. Dorelien,
431 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting prudential exhaustion for ATS claims).
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the applicability of prudential exhaustion for ATS claims,312 while the Ninth
Circuit has cast doubt on the applicability of exhaustion for FSIA claims.313
Extending prudential exhaustion to transnational cases is ill-advised as
both a legal and a practical matter. First, contrary to the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit,314 there is no requirement under international law that
private parties exhaust claims locally before suing in the domestic courts of
another country.315 Second, ATS or FSIA exhaustion differs significantly
from the concept of administrative exhaustion: while administrative
exhaustion leaves open the possibility of subsequent judicial review, judicial
resolution of claims in another sovereign’s courts—including the summary
rejection of those claims—will typically bar subsequent judicial review under
principles of res judicata. Requiring prudential exhaustion of claims in a
foreign court, in other words, is equivalent to denying the plaintiff a U.S.
forum.316 Third, not only is a prudential exhaustion requirement unnecessary
and impractical, it is also redundant with forum non conveniens, which can
address the foreign forum’s superior interest in a dispute through the public
interest factors. Particularly with an updated doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the concept of prudential exhaustion for transnational cases
should be interred as a failed experiment.
2. Rejecting Foreign Relations Abstention
Courts should also reject the use of abstention to address foreign relations
concerns—the version of “international comity abstention” applied in Cooper.
It is noteworthy that this use of “international comity abstention” emerged
in two cases (Ungaro-Benages and Mujica) in which the closely related doctrines
of act of state, political question, and forum non conveniens were held not to
apply. Foreign relations abstention is effectively an end run around the
legitimate constraints of these other doctrines.
312

313

314
315
316

See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting in dicta
that “[t]he implications of the argument border on the ridiculous; imagine having been required to
file suit in a court in Nazi Germany complaining about genocide, before being able to sue under
the [ATS]”).
See Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1034–37 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting
requirement of exhaustion for FSIA cases without addressing whether exhaustion could be directed
in individual cases).
See Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2012) (referencing customary
international law regarding claims that can be raised by states or before international bodies).
See Dodge, supra note 121, at 2010–11 n.243.
See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172, 1180 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[T]here is a substantial
risk that the Survivors’ exhaustion of any Hungarian remedy could preclude them by operation of
res judicata from ever bringing their claims in the United States.”).
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In both Ungaro-Benages and Mujica, the district courts initially relied on the
political question doctrine to dismiss the case.317 But as the Eleventh Circuit
explained in Ungaro-Benages, “not all issues that could potentially have
consequences to our foreign relations are political questions.”318 Nor does
Executive Branch support for dismissal alone render a case nonjusticiable:
courts may not “decline to resolve a controversy within their traditional
competence and proper jurisdiction simply because the question is difficult,
the consequences weighty, or the potential real for conflict with the policy
preferences of the political branches.”319 Yet the circuit courts in UngaroBenages and Mujica were left with a sense that these cases did not belong in
U.S. courts. In articulating a new basis to justify the dismissal of those cases,
the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits created precisely the sort of “vague doctrine
of abstention” that the Supreme Court warned against when it curtailed the
use of the act of state doctrine to dismiss cases simply because they “may
embarrass foreign governments.”320
And foreign relations abstention is indeed vague. Ungaro-Benages defined
the factors to be considered as “the strength of the United States’ interest in
using a foreign forum, the strength of the foreign government’s interests, and
the adequacy of the alternative forum.”321 As the Ninth Circuit in Mujica
acknowledged, Ungaro-Benages “offers no substantive standards for assessing
its three factors.”322 In trying to add specificity, Mujica suggested considering
nexus and regulatory interests along with “the foreign policy interests of the
United States,” “any public policy interests,” and “the interests of the foreign
state.”323 That elaboration does not provide the needed guidance, devolving

317
318

319

320
321
322
323

See Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d at 1229 (11th Cir. 2004); Mujica v. Airscan
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194–95 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1235 (holding that the political question doctrine did not apply); see also
Mujica v. Airscan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 616 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (Zilly, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining why he would have reversed the district court’s political question
ruling, which the majority avoided addressing by invoking international comity abstention instead).
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 205 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 194–95 (decision of the Court) (emphasizing
narrowness of the political question doctrine); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“[I]t is error
to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance.”).
W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envt’l Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406, 409 (1990).
Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238.
Mujica, 771 F.3d at 603.
Id. at 604, 607.
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again into a free-ranging inquiry regarding state interests324—precisely what
the Supreme Court has warned against in other contexts.
Mujica’s procedural history also highlights how foreign relations
abstention expands the scope of judicial discretion already exercised through
forum non conveniens.325 The overlap between the two doctrines is
significant, as illustrated by the largely identical analysis by the district court
in Cooper.326 But foreign relations abstention lacks both the history and the
constraints of forum non conveniens. Most significantly, foreign relations
abstention has no starting presumption in favor of retaining jurisdiction—no
acknowledgement, that is, of the separation-of-powers concern that always
arises when federal judges voluntarily decline to hear cases. As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly warned, political sensitivity is not a reason to refuse to
hear a case; if there are specific adjudicatory interests that merit deference,
judges can articulate a public interest factor within the forum non conveniens
analysis to account for them.
3. Distinguishing Preclusion and Statutory Interpretation
Finally, vague labels like the “doctrine of international comity” have led
some courts to invoke international comity abstention to address matters of
preclusion and statutory interpretation. Abstention is a doctrine of negative
adjudicative comity (or adjudicative comity acting as a principle of restraint);
preclusion, in contrast, is a matter of positive adjudicative comity (or
adjudicative comity acting as a principle of recognition), and statutory
interpretation is a matter of negative prescriptive comity.327 “[I]t is important
to stay inside the box” of each of these categories, as the “different valences
and purposes of comity [reflected in each category] can confuse judicial

324

325
326

327

As others have noted, comity doctrines are most problematic when they remain at such a high level
of generality. See Calamita, supra note 250, at 627 n.71 (“Comity’s unpredictable side emerges when
courts fail to use its principles to construct rules of meaningful specificity. Comity has been used to
justify schemes of ad hoc interest balancing that leave parties and lower courts with bewilderingly
little guidance.”); Dodge, supra note 121, at 2083 (noting that most comity-based doctrines take the
form of rules, with only doctrines of negative adjudicative comity—namely, transnational
abstention—being phrased in terms of broad standards).
See supra subsection I.B.1 (describing Mujica’s procedural history).
See Cooper II, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1132–40 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (in evaluating both doctrines,
considering similar facts and noting that the “standards for evaluating the adequacy of a forum are
the same”).
Gardner, supra note 13, at 94–95 & n.166; see also Dodge, supra note 121, at 2099–2109 (defining
prescriptive and adjudicative comity and dividing comity-based doctrines between those applying
comity as a “principle of recognition” and those applying it as a “principle of restraint”).
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analysis and potentially lead to erroneous outcomes.”328 Unlike abstention,
for example, doctrines of positive adjudicative comity and negative
prescriptive comity result in decisions on the merits. And they draw on
different sources of law: while abstention doctrines are created by federal
judges, the recognition of foreign judgments is typically determined by state
law and statutory interpretation is meant to give effect to legislative
intentions. The lines between these inquiries should be firmly maintained.
First, abstention is not the right vehicle for enforcing foreign judgments
or giving them preclusive effect in U.S. proceedings. Judgment enforcement
and preclusion first require recognition of the foreign judgment, which in
turn requires a final judgment.329 In contrast, a non-final judgment may still
be relevant for weighing deference to foreign parallel proceedings as it
indicates the advanced stage of proceedings in the foreign court.330 The
Eleventh Circuit in Turner thus put weight on a non-final German judgment
when deferring to German proceedings, but it perhaps unwisely used the
language of judgment enforcement when doing so.331 That mixing of
language may in turn have encouraged later Eleventh Circuit panels to
invoke Turner’s international comity abstention as a shortcut for giving
preclusive effect to foreign judgments.332 Good examples of opinions that
analyze these questions distinctly, in contrast, include Ingersoll Milling
Machinery Co. v. Granger, which separately analyzed judgment enforcement
and foreign parallel proceedings,333 and Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Systems
Inc.,334 which separately analyzed questions of issue preclusion, claim
preclusion, and foreign parallel proceedings, although without using those
precise labels.
One reason this distinction matters is because the source of law differs.
Abstention is a doctrine devised by federal judges; in contrast, state law

328
329
330
331
332

333
334

Gardner, supra note 13, at 95.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt.
d (AM. L. INST. 2018).
See supra subsection II.B.2 (discussing foreign parallel proceedings).
Turner Ent. Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519–220 (11th Cir. 1994).
See Daewoo Motor Am., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 459 F.3d 1249, 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006)
(invoking abstention to dismiss the plaintiff’s “collateral[] attack” on a Korean bankruptcy
proceeding in which the plaintiff had participated as an unsecured creditor); Belize Telecom, Ltd.
v. Gov’t of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298, 1303–09, 1305 n.9, 1308 n.12 (11th Cir. 2008) (invoking
abstention to give issue preclusive effect to a non-final Belize judgment).
833 F.2d 680, 685–90 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying separately the factors of Colorado River and Illinois’s
foreign judgments enforcement statute).
830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987).
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applies to the recognition of foreign judgments.335 For many states, that law
is typically statutory, often reflecting uniform acts;336 the state law applied in
Ingersoll, for instance, was such a statute.337 A possible source of confusion
arises when states rely instead on common law for the enforcement of foreign
judgments, which in turn may draw on federal sources. In Somportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,338 for example, the federal court applied
Pennsylvania state law, which at the time reflected the old common law of
foreign judgment enforcement described by the Supreme Court in Hilton v.
Guyot.339 Somportex’s references to Hilton do not imply that Hilton should guide
analysis of all judgment enforcement actions; to the contrary, such actions
remain governed by state law.
Giving effect to foreign judgments also requires an inquiry into foreign
law. To be recognized for either enforcement or preclusion purposes, the
foreign judgment must be final and conclusive under the rendering court’s
law.340 A foreign judgment also “ordinarily has no greater [preclusive] effect
in the United States than in the country where the judgment was
rendered.”341 This inquiry into foreign preclusion law is potentially an
onerous undertaking, despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1’s
flexibility regarding permissible sources for determining the content of
foreign law and the invoking party bearing the burden of establishing the
preclusion law of the foreign state.342 It is understandable, then, why courts
may be tempted to invoke abstention to short-circuit this full analysis, but
they do so at the risk of real unfairness to parties who may find themselves
effectively bound by non-final judgments or by judgments that the issuing
court did not intend to have preclusive effect.
Second, abstention is not the right vehicle for determining the geographic
reach of federal laws or deciding whether to apply U.S. or foreign law. Those
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt.
a (AM. L. INST. 2018).
Id.
Ingersoll, 833 F.2d at 686.
453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 440 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)).
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 487 cmt.
d & rep. n.4 (AM. L. INST. 2018).
Id. § 487 cmt. d.
The Restatement (Fourth) includes a rather significant loophole, however, in that it acknowledges that if
the party seeking preclusion does not carry the burden of establishing the preclusion law of the issuing
forum, then the U.S. court can presume that law to be the same as the law of the forum. Id. § 487 rep.
n.4. That does not seem to provide a very significant incentive to the party seeking preclusion as U.S.
preclusion law tends to be broader than that of other countries. See, e.g., id. cmt. a (noting that issue
preclusion is “not universally accepted outside the United States”).
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questions are instead questions of prescriptive comity. Like with transnational
preclusion, however, doctrinal and theoretical ambiguity around the limits
of prescriptive comity has encouraged elision between these questions of
statutory interpretation and the comforting vagueness of “international
comity abstention.” This much is clear: If a plaintiff has invoked state law
causes of action, a federal court should generally apply its forum state’s
choice of law rules to determine whether U.S. or foreign law should apply.343
If the plaintiff has invoked a federal statute, the judge will need to determine
whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute or, if not,
whether the statute rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality.344 That
analysis, unlike abstention, is a determination on the merits.345
For federal statutes that do rebut the presumption against
extraterrioriality, however, the Supreme Court has not clarified how judges
are to determine the outer limits of those statutes’ reach beyond the vague
direction that such statutes should be interpreted not to cause “unreasonable
interference” with foreign law.346 In the absence of clearer guidance from the
Supreme Court, some lower federal courts have continued to use the
Timberlane factors to determine what constitutes “unreasonable
interference.”347 Judges and litigants researching transnational abstention
should thus avoid relying on cases that invoke Timberlane, the similar test of
Mannington Mills,348 or the now-obsoleted Section 403 factors.349 These are all
flags that the prior decision was evaluating a question of prescriptive, not
adjudicative, comity. Likewise, decisions involving cross-border bankruptcies
have at times invoked “the doctrine of international comity”350 or

343
344

345
346

347

348
349
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See Zachary Clopton, Horizontal Choice of Law in Federal Court, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 2191 (2021).
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253–54 (2010). To be clear, the federal
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to state statutes. See generally Dodge, supra note
10 (describing variation in state approaches to extraterritoriality).
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253–54 (addressing extraterritoriality as a question of whether the complaint
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted).
See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004); see also Maggie
Gardner, Minding the Empagran Gap, 55 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 509 (2019) (describing this gap and
worrying about the practical consequences of the resulting uncertainty).
These factors derive from Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597,
613 (9th Cir. 1976). For recent invocations, see Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 969–75
(9th Cir. 2016) (Lanham Act); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2016),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865 (2018) (antitrust).
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979).
See supra note 34.
French v. Liebman (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 152 (4th Cir. 2006); Gitlin v. Societe Generale (In
re Maxwell Commc’n Corp.), 93 F.3d 1036, 1040 (2d Cir. 1996).
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“international comity principles”351 when determining whether U.S. law
should apply to a bankruptcy-related dispute. Unlike decisions deferring to
related foreign bankruptcy proceedings,352 these decisions are not about
abstention; rather, they are about choice of law and statutory interpretation.
For the most part, the circuit courts have been clear that they are
exercising prescriptive comity when they consider whether U.S. law should
apply to foreign conduct.353 But the vagueness of labels like the “doctrine of
international comity” can encourage courts to characterize prescriptive
comity analyses as exercises of transnational abstention.354 The most
important step federal courts could take to prevent further conflation is to
stop using the terms like “international comity abstention,” which is
unhelpfully vague, and the “doctrine of international comity,” which does
not exist. There are many doctrines of international comity, and there are
multiple doctrines of transnational abstention. Distinguishing clearly among
them is critical for keeping in check the assertion of the federal judicial power
to refuse to hear cases.
CONCLUSION
As the Fukushima cases illustrate, current doctrines of transnational
abstention are not helping judges answer the questions they are confronting.
Mismatched doctrines can in turn create pressures to expand the scope of
judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction. By encouraging federal courts to
reject cases based on subjective or unguided evaluations of which cases
“belong” in U.S. courts, loose doctrines of abstention risk overriding
congressional grants of federal jurisdiction, U.S. states’ efforts to protect their
residents, and the foreign policy preferences of the political branches.
Every jurisdictional system will require some equilibration devices. But
those devices need not be free-ranging. The roadmap offered here is
intended to help federal courts gradually refine forum non conveniens,
consolidate a distinct doctrine for addressing federal-foreign parallel

351
352
353
354

In re Picard, 917 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2019).
See supra Section II.C (listing such cases).
See, e.g., In re Picard, 917 F.3d at 101 (correctly characterizing In re Maxwell as a case involving
prescriptive comity, in contrast to Royal & Sun, which applied adjudicative comity).
See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2016) (labeling prescriptive
comity analysis as one of abstention), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei
Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018). Perhaps because of this labeling, the Second Circuit
subsequently—but I believe mistakenly—categorized Vitamin C as a decision applying adjudicative
comity. See In re Picard, 917 F.3d at 101 n.12.
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litigation, reject abstention based on foreign relations concerns or prudential
exhaustion requirements, and analyze questions of transnational preclusion
and extraterritorial application of federal statutes without resorting to loose
invocations of “abstention” or “international comity.” The goal is not
perfection, but a striving for constant improvement based on lived
experience, in the hope that congressional—and international—progress
may still be forthcoming.

